Two Objections to the Selfish Gene Theory

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bohórquez Carvajal, Julián
Data de Publicação: 2023
Outros Autores: Bernal Velásquez, Reinaldo
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: spa
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/85023
Resumo: We advance two objections to the selfish gene theory formulated by Richard Dawkins, which states that natural selection operates on genetic replicators. These objections target three of the essential features of the theory. The first feature is the exclusivity that the theory ascribes to genetic replicators as objects of natural selection. We call it “the exclusivity clause”. The second and third features correspond to two criteria that genetic replicators must satisfy for Dawkins’ theory to hold. We call them “the stability criterion” and “the fidelity criterion”. The first objection we advance is that, given the findings of transgenerational epigenetics, genetic replicators do not appear to satisfy the exclusivity clause and some of them do not seem to meet the stability criterion. The second objection is that the existence of the molecular phenomena known as alternative splicing and trans-splicing seems to entail that many genetic replicators do not satisfy neither the stability criterion nor the fidelity criterion.
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spelling Two Objections to the Selfish Gene TheoryDos objeciones a la teoría del gen egoístateoría del gen egoístaunidad de selecciónreplicador genéticoRichard Dawkinsepigenéticaselfish gene theoryunit of selectiongenetic replicatorsRichard DawkinsepigeneticsWe advance two objections to the selfish gene theory formulated by Richard Dawkins, which states that natural selection operates on genetic replicators. These objections target three of the essential features of the theory. The first feature is the exclusivity that the theory ascribes to genetic replicators as objects of natural selection. We call it “the exclusivity clause”. The second and third features correspond to two criteria that genetic replicators must satisfy for Dawkins’ theory to hold. We call them “the stability criterion” and “the fidelity criterion”. The first objection we advance is that, given the findings of transgenerational epigenetics, genetic replicators do not appear to satisfy the exclusivity clause and some of them do not seem to meet the stability criterion. The second objection is that the existence of the molecular phenomena known as alternative splicing and trans-splicing seems to entail that many genetic replicators do not satisfy neither the stability criterion nor the fidelity criterion.Presentamos dos objeciones a la teoría del gen egoísta formulada por Richard Dawkins, según la cual la selección natural opera sobre replicadores genéticos. Estas objeciones se dirigen hacia tres de las características esenciales de dicha teoría. La primera característica consiste en la exclusividad que, de acuerdo con la teoría, tienen los replicadores genéticos como objetos de la selección natural. La denominamos “cláusula de exclusividad”. Las características segunda y tercera corresponden a dos criterios que los replicadores genéticos deben satisfacer para que la teoría se sostenga. Los denominamos “criterio de estabilidad” y “criterio de fidelidad”. La primera objeción que presentamos consiste en señalar que, en virtud de los hallazgos de la epigenética transgeneracional, los replicadores genéticos no parecen satisfacer la cláusula de exclusividad y algunos de ellos tampoco parecen cumplir con el criterio de estabilidad. La segunda objeción es que la existencia de los fenómenos moleculares conocidos como splicing alternativo y trans-splicing parece implicar que muchos replicadores genéticos no satisfacen ni el criterio de estabilidad ni el de fidelidad. Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2023-12-27info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/8502310.5007/1808-1711.2023.e85023Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 3 (2023); 373-396Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 3 (2023); 373-396Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 3 (2023); 373-3961808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCspahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/85023/55056Copyright (c) 2023 Julián Bohórquez Carvajal, Reinaldo Bernal Velásquezhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBohórquez Carvajal, JuliánBernal Velásquez, Reinaldo2023-12-27T11:00:27Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/85023Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2023-12-27T11:00:27Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Two Objections to the Selfish Gene Theory
Dos objeciones a la teoría del gen egoísta
title Two Objections to the Selfish Gene Theory
spellingShingle Two Objections to the Selfish Gene Theory
Bohórquez Carvajal, Julián
teoría del gen egoísta
unidad de selección
replicador genético
Richard Dawkins
epigenética
selfish gene theory
unit of selection
genetic replicators
Richard Dawkins
epigenetics
title_short Two Objections to the Selfish Gene Theory
title_full Two Objections to the Selfish Gene Theory
title_fullStr Two Objections to the Selfish Gene Theory
title_full_unstemmed Two Objections to the Selfish Gene Theory
title_sort Two Objections to the Selfish Gene Theory
author Bohórquez Carvajal, Julián
author_facet Bohórquez Carvajal, Julián
Bernal Velásquez, Reinaldo
author_role author
author2 Bernal Velásquez, Reinaldo
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bohórquez Carvajal, Julián
Bernal Velásquez, Reinaldo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv teoría del gen egoísta
unidad de selección
replicador genético
Richard Dawkins
epigenética
selfish gene theory
unit of selection
genetic replicators
Richard Dawkins
epigenetics
topic teoría del gen egoísta
unidad de selección
replicador genético
Richard Dawkins
epigenética
selfish gene theory
unit of selection
genetic replicators
Richard Dawkins
epigenetics
description We advance two objections to the selfish gene theory formulated by Richard Dawkins, which states that natural selection operates on genetic replicators. These objections target three of the essential features of the theory. The first feature is the exclusivity that the theory ascribes to genetic replicators as objects of natural selection. We call it “the exclusivity clause”. The second and third features correspond to two criteria that genetic replicators must satisfy for Dawkins’ theory to hold. We call them “the stability criterion” and “the fidelity criterion”. The first objection we advance is that, given the findings of transgenerational epigenetics, genetic replicators do not appear to satisfy the exclusivity clause and some of them do not seem to meet the stability criterion. The second objection is that the existence of the molecular phenomena known as alternative splicing and trans-splicing seems to entail that many genetic replicators do not satisfy neither the stability criterion nor the fidelity criterion.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023-12-27
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/85023
10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e85023
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/85023
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e85023
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/85023/55056
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Julián Bohórquez Carvajal, Reinaldo Bernal Velásquez
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2023 Julián Bohórquez Carvajal, Reinaldo Bernal Velásquez
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 3 (2023); 373-396
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 3 (2023); 373-396
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 3 (2023); 373-396
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
_version_ 1799875201204224000

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