The Constitutive Aim of Inquiry
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/82053 |
Resumo: | In recent years, there has been a growing interest in epistemic agency among philosophers. This development is in part owing to a growing interest in mental agency and epistemic normativity, along with associated concepts such as epistemic responsibility and the relationship between epistemic rationality and practical rationality. Most authors have focused solely on our agency exercised in the process of acquiring or forming beliefs in response to reasons. But some have examined temporally extended procedural epistemic agency, in particular our agency exercised in the process of inquiry. In this article, I argue for an account of procedural epistemic normativity grounded in a conception of the constitutive aim of inquiry. In doing so I will examine how an account of the constitutive aim of inquiry may both differ from and be like accounts of the constitutive aim of belief and the constitutive aim of intentional action. I propose that the constitutive aim of inquiry is understanding and that the aim of understanding may provide us with the norms of inquiry. |
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The Constitutive Aim of InquiryInquiryEpistemic normativityEpistemic agencyConstitutivismIn recent years, there has been a growing interest in epistemic agency among philosophers. This development is in part owing to a growing interest in mental agency and epistemic normativity, along with associated concepts such as epistemic responsibility and the relationship between epistemic rationality and practical rationality. Most authors have focused solely on our agency exercised in the process of acquiring or forming beliefs in response to reasons. But some have examined temporally extended procedural epistemic agency, in particular our agency exercised in the process of inquiry. In this article, I argue for an account of procedural epistemic normativity grounded in a conception of the constitutive aim of inquiry. In doing so I will examine how an account of the constitutive aim of inquiry may both differ from and be like accounts of the constitutive aim of belief and the constitutive aim of intentional action. I propose that the constitutive aim of inquiry is understanding and that the aim of understanding may provide us with the norms of inquiry.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2023-10-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/8205310.5007/1808-1711.2023.e82053Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 2 (2023); 319–333Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 2 (2023); 319–333Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 2 (2023); 319–3331808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/82053/54361Copyright (c) 2023 Andrei Buckareffhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBuckareff, Andrei2023-10-22T20:38:02Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/82053Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2023-10-22T20:38:02Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Constitutive Aim of Inquiry |
title |
The Constitutive Aim of Inquiry |
spellingShingle |
The Constitutive Aim of Inquiry Buckareff, Andrei Inquiry Epistemic normativity Epistemic agency Constitutivism |
title_short |
The Constitutive Aim of Inquiry |
title_full |
The Constitutive Aim of Inquiry |
title_fullStr |
The Constitutive Aim of Inquiry |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Constitutive Aim of Inquiry |
title_sort |
The Constitutive Aim of Inquiry |
author |
Buckareff, Andrei |
author_facet |
Buckareff, Andrei |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Buckareff, Andrei |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Inquiry Epistemic normativity Epistemic agency Constitutivism |
topic |
Inquiry Epistemic normativity Epistemic agency Constitutivism |
description |
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in epistemic agency among philosophers. This development is in part owing to a growing interest in mental agency and epistemic normativity, along with associated concepts such as epistemic responsibility and the relationship between epistemic rationality and practical rationality. Most authors have focused solely on our agency exercised in the process of acquiring or forming beliefs in response to reasons. But some have examined temporally extended procedural epistemic agency, in particular our agency exercised in the process of inquiry. In this article, I argue for an account of procedural epistemic normativity grounded in a conception of the constitutive aim of inquiry. In doing so I will examine how an account of the constitutive aim of inquiry may both differ from and be like accounts of the constitutive aim of belief and the constitutive aim of intentional action. I propose that the constitutive aim of inquiry is understanding and that the aim of understanding may provide us with the norms of inquiry. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-10-06 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/82053 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e82053 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/82053 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e82053 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/82053/54361 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Andrei Buckareff http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Andrei Buckareff http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 2 (2023); 319–333 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 2 (2023); 319–333 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 2 (2023); 319–333 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1799875201184301056 |