Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000400097 |
Resumo: | ABSTRACT According to G.E. Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument (OQA), moral facts cannot be reduced or analyzed in non-normative natural terms. Does the OQA apply equally in the epistemic domain? Does Moore’s argument have the same force against reductionist accounts of epistemic facts and concepts? In a recent article, Daniel Greco has argued that it does. According to Greco (2015), an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin, because the relevant questions in epistemology are just as ‘open’ as those in ethics. In this paper, I offer a two-part reply to Greco. First, I argue that his argument in favor of the openness of epistemology is not persuasive. Second, I offer a case against the openness of epistemology. Unlike claims linking natural and moral properties, claims linking natural and epistemological properties do give rise to closed questions. An epistemological OQA is therefore not as promising as its moral cousin. |
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Epistemological closed questions: A reply to GrecoEpistemologyMetaethics‘Open question’ argumentEpistemic normativityABSTRACT According to G.E. Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument (OQA), moral facts cannot be reduced or analyzed in non-normative natural terms. Does the OQA apply equally in the epistemic domain? Does Moore’s argument have the same force against reductionist accounts of epistemic facts and concepts? In a recent article, Daniel Greco has argued that it does. According to Greco (2015), an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin, because the relevant questions in epistemology are just as ‘open’ as those in ethics. In this paper, I offer a two-part reply to Greco. First, I argue that his argument in favor of the openness of epistemology is not persuasive. Second, I offer a case against the openness of epistemology. Unlike claims linking natural and moral properties, claims linking natural and epistemological properties do give rise to closed questions. An epistemological OQA is therefore not as promising as its moral cousin.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2017-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000400097Manuscrito v.40 n.4 2017reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n4.ccinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCôte-Bouchard,Charleseng2018-02-19T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452017000400097Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-02-19T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco |
title |
Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco |
spellingShingle |
Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco Côte-Bouchard,Charles Epistemology Metaethics ‘Open question’ argument Epistemic normativity |
title_short |
Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco |
title_full |
Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco |
title_fullStr |
Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco |
title_full_unstemmed |
Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco |
title_sort |
Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco |
author |
Côte-Bouchard,Charles |
author_facet |
Côte-Bouchard,Charles |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Côte-Bouchard,Charles |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Epistemology Metaethics ‘Open question’ argument Epistemic normativity |
topic |
Epistemology Metaethics ‘Open question’ argument Epistemic normativity |
description |
ABSTRACT According to G.E. Moore’s ‘Open Question’ argument (OQA), moral facts cannot be reduced or analyzed in non-normative natural terms. Does the OQA apply equally in the epistemic domain? Does Moore’s argument have the same force against reductionist accounts of epistemic facts and concepts? In a recent article, Daniel Greco has argued that it does. According to Greco (2015), an epistemological version of the OQA is just as promising as its moral cousin, because the relevant questions in epistemology are just as ‘open’ as those in ethics. In this paper, I offer a two-part reply to Greco. First, I argue that his argument in favor of the openness of epistemology is not persuasive. Second, I offer a case against the openness of epistemology. Unlike claims linking natural and moral properties, claims linking natural and epistemological properties do give rise to closed questions. An epistemological OQA is therefore not as promising as its moral cousin. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-12-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000400097 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000400097 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n4.cc |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito v.40 n.4 2017 reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1748950065391599616 |