Propositional Attitudes, intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Dutra, Luiz Henrique de A.
Data de Publicação: 2003
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14793
Resumo: This paper aims to discuss Quine’s last analysis of propositional attitudes as involving intentionality and as regards human action and the very sub-ject matter of social sciences. As to this problem, Quine acquiesces in both Davidson’s anomalous monism and Dennett’s intentional stance. An al-ternative analysis is here presented, which is based on Howard Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism. Some problems regarding this approach are also considered. Intentionality and rationality are still to be saved, but they are construed according to a lawful perspective to human behavior and social contexts of action.
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spelling Propositional Attitudes, intentionality, and Lawful BehaviorsThis paper aims to discuss Quine’s last analysis of propositional attitudes as involving intentionality and as regards human action and the very sub-ject matter of social sciences. As to this problem, Quine acquiesces in both Davidson’s anomalous monism and Dennett’s intentional stance. An al-ternative analysis is here presented, which is based on Howard Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism. Some problems regarding this approach are also considered. Intentionality and rationality are still to be saved, but they are construed according to a lawful perspective to human behavior and social contexts of action.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2003-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1479310.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 No. 1-2 (2003); 93-114Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 Núm. 1-2 (2003); 93-114Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 7 n. 1-2 (2003); 93-1141808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14793/13505Copyright (c) 2021 Luiz Henrique de A. Dutrahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDutra, Luiz Henrique de A.2016-01-02T12:16:55Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14793Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:16:55Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Propositional Attitudes, intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors
title Propositional Attitudes, intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors
spellingShingle Propositional Attitudes, intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors
Dutra, Luiz Henrique de A.
title_short Propositional Attitudes, intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors
title_full Propositional Attitudes, intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors
title_fullStr Propositional Attitudes, intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors
title_full_unstemmed Propositional Attitudes, intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors
title_sort Propositional Attitudes, intentionality, and Lawful Behaviors
author Dutra, Luiz Henrique de A.
author_facet Dutra, Luiz Henrique de A.
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Dutra, Luiz Henrique de A.
description This paper aims to discuss Quine’s last analysis of propositional attitudes as involving intentionality and as regards human action and the very sub-ject matter of social sciences. As to this problem, Quine acquiesces in both Davidson’s anomalous monism and Dennett’s intentional stance. An al-ternative analysis is here presented, which is based on Howard Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism. Some problems regarding this approach are also considered. Intentionality and rationality are still to be saved, but they are construed according to a lawful perspective to human behavior and social contexts of action.
publishDate 2003
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2003-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14793
10.5007/%x
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14793
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/%x
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14793/13505
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 No. 1-2 (2003); 93-114
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 7 Núm. 1-2 (2003); 93-114
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 7 n. 1-2 (2003); 93-114
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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