Epistemic analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: MacBain, James
Data de Publicação: 2004
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14643
Resumo: Edward Craig has proposed that epistemology should eschew traditional conceptual analysis in favor of what he calls “conceptual synthesis.” He proposes we start not from the finding of necessary and sufficient conditions that match our intuitions; rather we start from considerations on what theconcept of knowledge does for us. In this paper I will explore one aspect of Craig’s proposal – the good informant. It is this aspect that is central to Craig’s epistemic method and perhaps most problematic. I will evaluate this concept by first articulating three initial worries that some have had about the concept and then show how each of the initial worries can be quelled by looking deeper into the features of what Craig’s proposal is. I then assess Craig’s proposal on its own terms by looking at the concept of a good informant in light of the criteria for an adequate explication. What I will show is that while there is much to be sympathetic with in Craig’s proposal, there are some open questions that need to be solved in order to say that an adequate explication has been reached.
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spelling Epistemic analysis and the Possibility of Good InformantsEpistemic Analysis and the Possibility of Good InformantsEdward Craig has proposed that epistemology should eschew traditional conceptual analysis in favor of what he calls “conceptual synthesis.” He proposes we start not from the finding of necessary and sufficient conditions that match our intuitions; rather we start from considerations on what theconcept of knowledge does for us. In this paper I will explore one aspect of Craig’s proposal – the good informant. It is this aspect that is central to Craig’s epistemic method and perhaps most problematic. I will evaluate this concept by first articulating three initial worries that some have had about the concept and then show how each of the initial worries can be quelled by looking deeper into the features of what Craig’s proposal is. I then assess Craig’s proposal on its own terms by looking at the concept of a good informant in light of the criteria for an adequate explication. What I will show is that while there is much to be sympathetic with in Craig’s proposal, there are some open questions that need to be solved in order to say that an adequate explication has been reached.Edward Craig propôs que a epistemologia deveria afastar a análise conceitual tradicional em favor do que ele denomina “síntese conceitual.” Ele propõe que não comecemos por encontrar condições necessárias e suficientes que correspondam a nossas intuições, e que, ao contrário, comecemos com as considerações sobre o que o conceito de conhecimento faz por nós. Neste artigo, vou explorar um aspecto da proposta de Craig – o bom informante. É esse aspecto que é central no método epistêmico de Craig, e talvez o mais problemático. Vou avaliar esse conceito, primeiro, articulando três preocupações iniciais que alguns tiveram sobre o conceito, e então mostrando como cada uma dessas preocupações iniciais pode ser acalmadas ao examinarmos com mais profundidade os aspectos daquilo que é a proposta de Craig. Então, avalio a proposta de Craig em seus próprios termos, tendo em conta o conceito de bom informante à luz dos critérios para uma boa explicação. O que vou mostrar é que, enquanto há muito com o que se possa concordar na proposta de Craig, há algumas questões deixadas em aberto, que precisam ser resolvidas para podermos dizer que uma explicação adequada foi alcançada.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2004-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1464310.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 No. 2 (2004); 193-211Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 Núm. 2 (2004); 193-211Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 8 n. 2 (2004); 193-2111808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14643/13390Copyright (c) 2021 James MacBainhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMacBain, James2016-01-02T12:16:04Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14643Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:16:04Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Epistemic analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants
Epistemic Analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants
title Epistemic analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants
spellingShingle Epistemic analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants
MacBain, James
title_short Epistemic analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants
title_full Epistemic analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants
title_fullStr Epistemic analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants
title_full_unstemmed Epistemic analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants
title_sort Epistemic analysis and the Possibility of Good Informants
author MacBain, James
author_facet MacBain, James
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv MacBain, James
description Edward Craig has proposed that epistemology should eschew traditional conceptual analysis in favor of what he calls “conceptual synthesis.” He proposes we start not from the finding of necessary and sufficient conditions that match our intuitions; rather we start from considerations on what theconcept of knowledge does for us. In this paper I will explore one aspect of Craig’s proposal – the good informant. It is this aspect that is central to Craig’s epistemic method and perhaps most problematic. I will evaluate this concept by first articulating three initial worries that some have had about the concept and then show how each of the initial worries can be quelled by looking deeper into the features of what Craig’s proposal is. I then assess Craig’s proposal on its own terms by looking at the concept of a good informant in light of the criteria for an adequate explication. What I will show is that while there is much to be sympathetic with in Craig’s proposal, there are some open questions that need to be solved in order to say that an adequate explication has been reached.
publishDate 2004
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2004-01-01
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14643
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url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14643
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/%x
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14643/13390
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 James MacBain
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 James MacBain
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 No. 2 (2004); 193-211
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 Núm. 2 (2004); 193-211
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 8 n. 2 (2004); 193-211
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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