Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bueno, Otávio
Data de Publicação: 2005
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14541
Resumo: In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our beliefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoherent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a coherence theory has, a response to skepticism is not among them. After distinguishing three forms of skepticism (global skepticism, Pyrrhonianskepticism and lottery skepticism), I argue that none of them is affected by Davidson’s strategy.
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spelling Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the SkepticDavidson on Skepticism: How not to Respond to the SkepticIn his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our beliefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoherent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a coherence theory has, a response to skepticism is not among them. After distinguishing three forms of skepticism (global skepticism, Pyrrhonianskepticism and lottery skepticism), I argue that none of them is affected by Davidson’s strategy.Em sua defesa de uma teoria da coerência da verdade e do conhecimento, Donald Davidson insiste que (i) temos que considerar os objetos de uma crença como as causas dessa crença, e (ii) dada a natureza das crenças, a maioria de nossas crenças são verídicas. Em conseqüência, é fornecida uma resposta ao ceticismo. Se a maioria de nossas crenças mostra-se verdadeira, o ceticismo global é, ao fim das contas, incoerente. Neste artigo, argumento que, apesar dos muitos atrativos que tem um ateoria da coerência, uma resposta ao ceticismo não se encontra entre eles. Depois de discutir três formas de ceticismo (global, pirrônico e ceticismo de loteria), argumento que nenhuma delas é afetada pela estratégia de Davidson.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2005-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1454110.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 No. 1-2 (2005); 1-18Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 Núm. 1-2 (2005); 1-18Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 9 n. 1-2 (2005); 1-181808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14541/13313Copyright (c) 2021 Otávio Buenohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBueno, Otávio2016-01-02T12:15:36Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14541Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:15:36Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
Davidson on Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
title Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
spellingShingle Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
Bueno, Otávio
title_short Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
title_full Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
title_fullStr Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
title_full_unstemmed Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
title_sort Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
author Bueno, Otávio
author_facet Bueno, Otávio
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bueno, Otávio
description In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our beliefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoherent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a coherence theory has, a response to skepticism is not among them. After distinguishing three forms of skepticism (global skepticism, Pyrrhonianskepticism and lottery skepticism), I argue that none of them is affected by Davidson’s strategy.
publishDate 2005
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2005-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14541
10.5007/%x
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14541
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/%x
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14541/13313
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Otávio Bueno
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Otávio Bueno
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 No. 1-2 (2005); 1-18
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 Núm. 1-2 (2005); 1-18
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 9 n. 1-2 (2005); 1-18
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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