Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2005 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14541 |
Resumo: | In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our beliefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoherent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a coherence theory has, a response to skepticism is not among them. After distinguishing three forms of skepticism (global skepticism, Pyrrhonianskepticism and lottery skepticism), I argue that none of them is affected by Davidson’s strategy. |
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Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the SkepticDavidson on Skepticism: How not to Respond to the SkepticIn his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our beliefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoherent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a coherence theory has, a response to skepticism is not among them. After distinguishing three forms of skepticism (global skepticism, Pyrrhonianskepticism and lottery skepticism), I argue that none of them is affected by Davidson’s strategy.Em sua defesa de uma teoria da coerência da verdade e do conhecimento, Donald Davidson insiste que (i) temos que considerar os objetos de uma crença como as causas dessa crença, e (ii) dada a natureza das crenças, a maioria de nossas crenças são verídicas. Em conseqüência, é fornecida uma resposta ao ceticismo. Se a maioria de nossas crenças mostra-se verdadeira, o ceticismo global é, ao fim das contas, incoerente. Neste artigo, argumento que, apesar dos muitos atrativos que tem um ateoria da coerência, uma resposta ao ceticismo não se encontra entre eles. Depois de discutir três formas de ceticismo (global, pirrônico e ceticismo de loteria), argumento que nenhuma delas é afetada pela estratégia de Davidson.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2005-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1454110.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 No. 1-2 (2005); 1-18Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 Núm. 1-2 (2005); 1-18Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 9 n. 1-2 (2005); 1-181808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14541/13313Copyright (c) 2021 Otávio Buenohttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBueno, Otávio2016-01-02T12:15:36Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14541Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:15:36Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic Davidson on Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic |
title |
Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic |
spellingShingle |
Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic Bueno, Otávio |
title_short |
Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic |
title_full |
Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic |
title_fullStr |
Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic |
title_full_unstemmed |
Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic |
title_sort |
Davidson and Skepticism: How not to Respond to the Skeptic |
author |
Bueno, Otávio |
author_facet |
Bueno, Otávio |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Bueno, Otávio |
description |
In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our beliefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoherent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a coherence theory has, a response to skepticism is not among them. After distinguishing three forms of skepticism (global skepticism, Pyrrhonianskepticism and lottery skepticism), I argue that none of them is affected by Davidson’s strategy. |
publishDate |
2005 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2005-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14541 10.5007/%x |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14541 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/%x |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14541/13313 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Otávio Bueno http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Otávio Bueno http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 No. 1-2 (2005); 1-18 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 Núm. 1-2 (2005); 1-18 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 9 n. 1-2 (2005); 1-18 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435108916199424 |