A pragmatics view of truth
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2004 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14647 |
Resumo: | This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth bearer, i.e. something capable of being true, for instance, propositions, sentences or statements. According to the analysis here proposed, none of these truth bearers can be defined without reference to the others. The pragmatic, alternative view here presented, in its turn, is unaffected by this kind of conceptual difficulty. According to this view, one must focus on the use of truth terms – such as ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘correct’, ‘appropriate’, etc. – and the methodological role such terms play in the investigative practices and research programs to be found both in the sciences and in other, everyday investigative activities, such as forensic and journalistic investigations. |
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A pragmatics view of truthA Pragmatic View of TruthThis paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth bearer, i.e. something capable of being true, for instance, propositions, sentences or statements. According to the analysis here proposed, none of these truth bearers can be defined without reference to the others. The pragmatic, alternative view here presented, in its turn, is unaffected by this kind of conceptual difficulty. According to this view, one must focus on the use of truth terms – such as ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘correct’, ‘appropriate’, etc. – and the methodological role such terms play in the investigative practices and research programs to be found both in the sciences and in other, everyday investigative activities, such as forensic and journalistic investigations.Este artigo propõe uma concepção alternativa da relação entre conhecimento e verdade. A verdade é tradicionalmente vista como uma noção semântica, isto é, uma relação entre o que dizemos do mundo e o próprio mundo. Os epistemólogos e filósofos da ciência tendem, pois, a recorrer a teorias da verdade como correspondência para lidar com a questão se nossas teorias e crenças são verdadeiras. As teorias da verdade como correspondência procuram definir a verdade, mas, para fazer isso, elas devem escolher um portador de verdade, isto é, algo que possa ser verdadeiro, por exemplo, proposições, sentenças ou enunciados. De acordo com a análise aqui proposta, nenhum desses portadores de verdade pode ser definido sem referência aos outros. A concepção pragmática e alternativa aqui apresentada, por sua vez, não é afetada por esse tipo de dificuldade conceitual. De acordo com essa concepção, devemos nos concentrar no uso dos termos veritativos – como ‘verdadeiro’, ‘falso’, ‘correto’, ‘apropriado’, etc. – e no papel metodológico que tais termos desempenham nas práticas investigativas em programas de pesquisa encontrados tanto nas ciências quanto em outras atividades investigativas do dia-a-dia, como as investigações policiais e jornalísticas.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2004-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1464710.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 No. 2 (2004); 259-277Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 Núm. 2 (2004); 259-277Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 8 n. 2 (2004); 259-2771808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14647/13394Copyright (c) 2021 Luiz Henrique de A. Dutrahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessDutra, Luiz Henrique de A.2016-01-02T12:16:04Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14647Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:16:04Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
A pragmatics view of truth A Pragmatic View of Truth |
title |
A pragmatics view of truth |
spellingShingle |
A pragmatics view of truth Dutra, Luiz Henrique de A. |
title_short |
A pragmatics view of truth |
title_full |
A pragmatics view of truth |
title_fullStr |
A pragmatics view of truth |
title_full_unstemmed |
A pragmatics view of truth |
title_sort |
A pragmatics view of truth |
author |
Dutra, Luiz Henrique de A. |
author_facet |
Dutra, Luiz Henrique de A. |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Dutra, Luiz Henrique de A. |
description |
This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth bearer, i.e. something capable of being true, for instance, propositions, sentences or statements. According to the analysis here proposed, none of these truth bearers can be defined without reference to the others. The pragmatic, alternative view here presented, in its turn, is unaffected by this kind of conceptual difficulty. According to this view, one must focus on the use of truth terms – such as ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘correct’, ‘appropriate’, etc. – and the methodological role such terms play in the investigative practices and research programs to be found both in the sciences and in other, everyday investigative activities, such as forensic and journalistic investigations. |
publishDate |
2004 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2004-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14647 10.5007/%x |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14647 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/%x |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14647/13394 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 No. 2 (2004); 259-277 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 8 Núm. 2 (2004); 259-277 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 8 n. 2 (2004); 259-277 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435110141984768 |