The unity truth and the plurality of truths

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Haack, Susan
Data de Publicação: 2005
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14600
Resumo: There is one truth, but many truths: i.e., one unambiguous, non-relative truth-concept, but many and various propositions that are true. One truth-concept: to say that a proposition is true is to say (not that anyone, or everyone, believes it, but) that things are as it says; but many truths: particular empirical claims, scientific theories, historical propositions, mathematical theorems, logical principles, textual interpretations, statementsabout what a person wants or believes or intends, about grammatical and legal rules, etc., etc. But, as Frank Ramsey once said, “There is no platitude so obvious that eminent philosophers have not denied it”; and as soon as you ask why anyone would deny that there is one truth-concept, or that there are many true propositions, it becomes apparent that my initial, simple formula disguises many complexities.
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spelling The unity truth and the plurality of truthsThe Unity of Truth and the Plurality of TruthsThere is one truth, but many truths: i.e., one unambiguous, non-relative truth-concept, but many and various propositions that are true. One truth-concept: to say that a proposition is true is to say (not that anyone, or everyone, believes it, but) that things are as it says; but many truths: particular empirical claims, scientific theories, historical propositions, mathematical theorems, logical principles, textual interpretations, statementsabout what a person wants or believes or intends, about grammatical and legal rules, etc., etc. But, as Frank Ramsey once said, “There is no platitude so obvious that eminent philosophers have not denied it”; and as soon as you ask why anyone would deny that there is one truth-concept, or that there are many true propositions, it becomes apparent that my initial, simple formula disguises many complexities.Há uma verdade, mas muitas verdades, isto é, um conceito de verdade não-ambíguo e não-relativo, mas muitas e diferentes proposições que são verdadeira. Um conceito de verdade: dizer que uma proposição é verdadeira é dizer (não que qualquer um, ou todos, acreditam nela, mas) que as coisas são como ela diz. Mas muitas verdades: alegações empíricas e particulares, teorias científicas, proposições históricas, teoremas da matemática, princípios lógicos, interpretações de textos, enunciados sobre o que uma pessoa quer, ou em que acredita, ou pretende, sobre regras gramaticais e legais, etc., etc. Mas, como Frank Ramsey disse uma vez: “Não há nenhuma obviedade tão óbvia que não tenha sido negada por filósofos famosos”; e tão logo perguntaríamos por que alguém negaria que há um conceito de verdade, ou que há diversas proposições verdadeiras, torna-se evidente que minha fórmula inicial e simples esconde muitas complexidades.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2005-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1460010.5007/%xPrincipia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 No. 1-2 (2005); 87-109Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 Núm. 1-2 (2005); 87-109Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 9 n. 1-2 (2005); 87-1091808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14600/13351Copyright (c) 2021 Susan Haackhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessHaack, Susan2016-01-02T12:15:36Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/14600Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2016-01-02T12:15:36Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The unity truth and the plurality of truths
The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths
title The unity truth and the plurality of truths
spellingShingle The unity truth and the plurality of truths
Haack, Susan
title_short The unity truth and the plurality of truths
title_full The unity truth and the plurality of truths
title_fullStr The unity truth and the plurality of truths
title_full_unstemmed The unity truth and the plurality of truths
title_sort The unity truth and the plurality of truths
author Haack, Susan
author_facet Haack, Susan
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Haack, Susan
description There is one truth, but many truths: i.e., one unambiguous, non-relative truth-concept, but many and various propositions that are true. One truth-concept: to say that a proposition is true is to say (not that anyone, or everyone, believes it, but) that things are as it says; but many truths: particular empirical claims, scientific theories, historical propositions, mathematical theorems, logical principles, textual interpretations, statementsabout what a person wants or believes or intends, about grammatical and legal rules, etc., etc. But, as Frank Ramsey once said, “There is no platitude so obvious that eminent philosophers have not denied it”; and as soon as you ask why anyone would deny that there is one truth-concept, or that there are many true propositions, it becomes apparent that my initial, simple formula disguises many complexities.
publishDate 2005
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2005-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14600
10.5007/%x
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14600
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/%x
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14600/13351
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Susan Haack
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Susan Haack
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 No. 1-2 (2005); 87-109
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 9 Núm. 1-2 (2005); 87-109
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 9 n. 1-2 (2005); 87-109
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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