The Epistemological Role of Consciousness in Descartes’ Meditations

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Freitas, Vinícius França
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/75658
Resumo: The paper discusses the epistemological role of consciousness in Rene Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. The discussion focuses on the truth of consciousness beliefs before the skeptical hypothesis of the deceiver. First, it is argued that Descartes’ discovery of the cogito in Meditation II is consistent from the point of view of consciousness. Its activities allow the intuition of cogito in a non-problematic way and the hypothesis of the deceiver does not threat that discovery. Second, it is argued that there is no solid argument in the Meditations for the truth of consciousness beliefs about the states and activities of the mind. Descartes cannot reliably distinguish between his thoughts in the context of this skeptical hypothesis to continue his itinerary. Finally, it questions four interpretations that could be indicated as replies to that objection.
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spelling The Epistemological Role of Consciousness in Descartes’ MeditationsO Papel Epistemológico da Consciência nas Meditações de DescartesThe paper discusses the epistemological role of consciousness in Rene Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. The discussion focuses on the truth of consciousness beliefs before the skeptical hypothesis of the deceiver. First, it is argued that Descartes’ discovery of the cogito in Meditation II is consistent from the point of view of consciousness. Its activities allow the intuition of cogito in a non-problematic way and the hypothesis of the deceiver does not threat that discovery. Second, it is argued that there is no solid argument in the Meditations for the truth of consciousness beliefs about the states and activities of the mind. Descartes cannot reliably distinguish between his thoughts in the context of this skeptical hypothesis to continue his itinerary. Finally, it questions four interpretations that could be indicated as replies to that objection.O artigo discute o papel epistemológico da consciência nas Meditações sobre filosofia primeira de René Descartes, mais especificamente, discute-se a consciência do ponto de vista da verdade de suas crenças no contexto da hipótese cética do supremo enganador. Em primeiro lugar, argumenta-se que o processo de descoberta da própria existência enquanto coisa que pensa na Meditação II é consistente do ponto de vista da fiabilidade da consciência. Suas atividades possibilitam – na presente interpretação – a intuição do cogito de modo não problemático diante enganador. Em segundo lugar, argumenta-se que não há, nas Meditações, um argumento sólido em favor da verdade das crenças da consciência sobre os estados e atividades mentais particulares. Descartes não pode distinguir seguramente entre seus pensamentos, no contexto dessa hipótese cética, para prosseguir com seu itinerário. No fim, quatro interpretações que poderiam ser indicadas como respostas para a dificuldade apontada são questionadas.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2021-12-15info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/7565810.5007/1808-1711.2021.e75658Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 25 No. 3 (2021); 401–420Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 25 Núm. 3 (2021); 401–420Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 25 n. 3 (2021); 401–4201808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/75658/47997Copyright (c) 2021 Vinícius França Freitashttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFreitas, Vinícius França 2021-12-15T13:27:48Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/75658Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2021-12-15T13:27:48Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Epistemological Role of Consciousness in Descartes’ Meditations
O Papel Epistemológico da Consciência nas Meditações de Descartes
title The Epistemological Role of Consciousness in Descartes’ Meditations
spellingShingle The Epistemological Role of Consciousness in Descartes’ Meditations
Freitas, Vinícius França
title_short The Epistemological Role of Consciousness in Descartes’ Meditations
title_full The Epistemological Role of Consciousness in Descartes’ Meditations
title_fullStr The Epistemological Role of Consciousness in Descartes’ Meditations
title_full_unstemmed The Epistemological Role of Consciousness in Descartes’ Meditations
title_sort The Epistemological Role of Consciousness in Descartes’ Meditations
author Freitas, Vinícius França
author_facet Freitas, Vinícius França
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Freitas, Vinícius França
description The paper discusses the epistemological role of consciousness in Rene Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy. The discussion focuses on the truth of consciousness beliefs before the skeptical hypothesis of the deceiver. First, it is argued that Descartes’ discovery of the cogito in Meditation II is consistent from the point of view of consciousness. Its activities allow the intuition of cogito in a non-problematic way and the hypothesis of the deceiver does not threat that discovery. Second, it is argued that there is no solid argument in the Meditations for the truth of consciousness beliefs about the states and activities of the mind. Descartes cannot reliably distinguish between his thoughts in the context of this skeptical hypothesis to continue his itinerary. Finally, it questions four interpretations that could be indicated as replies to that objection.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-12-15
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/75658
10.5007/1808-1711.2021.e75658
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/75658
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2021.e75658
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/75658/47997
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Vinícius França Freitas
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Vinícius França Freitas
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 25 No. 3 (2021); 401–420
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 25 Núm. 3 (2021); 401–420
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 25 n. 3 (2021); 401–420
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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