On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutions
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/92106 |
Resumo: | Many semantic theories become trivial when extended with a naïve validity predicate due to the validity paradoxes. The non-classical semantic theories are the ones that allegedly preserve the naïveté of the validity predicate while being capable of avoiding the validity paradoxes. This blocking, on the other hand, usually comes at a high cost. In this paper, we argue that the pre-theoretical notion of validity that the naïve validity predicate intends to capture is unattainable. |
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On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutionsParadoxesPredicatesNon-Classical LogicLogical ValidityPhilosophy of LogicMany semantic theories become trivial when extended with a naïve validity predicate due to the validity paradoxes. The non-classical semantic theories are the ones that allegedly preserve the naïveté of the validity predicate while being capable of avoiding the validity paradoxes. This blocking, on the other hand, usually comes at a high cost. In this paper, we argue that the pre-theoretical notion of validity that the naïve validity predicate intends to capture is unattainable.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2023-12-27info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/9210610.5007/1808-1711.2023.e92106Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 3 (2023); 519-538Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 3 (2023); 519-538Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 3 (2023); 519-5381808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/92106/55064Copyright (c) 2023 Edson Bezerrahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessBezerra, Edson2023-12-27T11:00:23Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/92106Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2023-12-27T11:00:23Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutions |
title |
On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutions |
spellingShingle |
On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutions Bezerra, Edson Paradoxes Predicates Non-Classical Logic Logical Validity Philosophy of Logic |
title_short |
On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutions |
title_full |
On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutions |
title_fullStr |
On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutions |
title_full_unstemmed |
On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutions |
title_sort |
On validity paradoxes and (some of) their solutions |
author |
Bezerra, Edson |
author_facet |
Bezerra, Edson |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Bezerra, Edson |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Paradoxes Predicates Non-Classical Logic Logical Validity Philosophy of Logic |
topic |
Paradoxes Predicates Non-Classical Logic Logical Validity Philosophy of Logic |
description |
Many semantic theories become trivial when extended with a naïve validity predicate due to the validity paradoxes. The non-classical semantic theories are the ones that allegedly preserve the naïveté of the validity predicate while being capable of avoiding the validity paradoxes. This blocking, on the other hand, usually comes at a high cost. In this paper, we argue that the pre-theoretical notion of validity that the naïve validity predicate intends to capture is unattainable. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-12-27 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/92106 10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e92106 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/92106 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2023.e92106 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/92106/55064 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Edson Bezerra http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Edson Bezerra http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 No. 3 (2023); 519-538 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 27 Núm. 3 (2023); 519-538 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 27 n. 3 (2023); 519-538 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1799875201239875584 |