Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
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Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | spa |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1 |
Resumo: | Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should “split the difference” between the epistemic peers’ opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers’ opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti–intuitive consequences conciliatory positions have. In particular, a semi-conciliatory view is not condemned to give incoherent instructions when applied to disagreement about it. |
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Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerenciaDesacuerdos, paridad epistémica e incoherenciaConciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should “split the difference” between the epistemic peers’ opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers’ opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti–intuitive consequences conciliatory positions have. In particular, a semi-conciliatory view is not condemned to give incoherent instructions when applied to disagreement about it.As posições conciliadoras acerca do desacordo sustentam que devemos “partilhar a diferença” entre as opiniões dos pares epistêmicos. Todavia, quando aplicadas ao desacordo de posições conciliadoras, resultam em instruções incoerentes. Uma posição semiconciliadora é aquela que aceita que as opiniões dos pares são parte do corpo de evidências relevantes nessas situações. Se adotamos este tipo de concepção, todos os casos que parecem favorecer concepções conciliatórias podem ser explicados, sem com isso nos comprometer com as consequências contra–intuitivas que as posições conciliatórias tem. Em particular, uma concepção semi-conciliadora não está condenada a dar instruções incoerentes quando aplicada a desacordos sobre ela mesma. Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2013-04-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p110.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 No. 1 (2013); 01-18Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 Núm. 1 (2013); 01-18Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 17 n. 1 (2013); 01-181808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCspahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1/26260Copyright (c) 2021 Federico Matías Pailos, Pablo Di Paoloinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPailos, Federico MatíasPaolo, Pablo Di2019-09-13T08:46:49Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/30473Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-13T08:46:49Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia Desacuerdos, paridad epistémica e incoherencia |
title |
Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia |
spellingShingle |
Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia Pailos, Federico Matías |
title_short |
Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia |
title_full |
Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia |
title_fullStr |
Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia |
title_full_unstemmed |
Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia |
title_sort |
Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia |
author |
Pailos, Federico Matías |
author_facet |
Pailos, Federico Matías Paolo, Pablo Di |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Paolo, Pablo Di |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Pailos, Federico Matías Paolo, Pablo Di |
description |
Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should “split the difference” between the epistemic peers’ opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers’ opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti–intuitive consequences conciliatory positions have. In particular, a semi-conciliatory view is not condemned to give incoherent instructions when applied to disagreement about it. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013-04-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1 10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1/26260 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Federico Matías Pailos, Pablo Di Paolo info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Federico Matías Pailos, Pablo Di Paolo |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 No. 1 (2013); 01-18 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 Núm. 1 (2013); 01-18 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 17 n. 1 (2013); 01-18 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
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1789435112539029504 |