Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pailos, Federico Matías
Data de Publicação: 2013
Outros Autores: Paolo, Pablo Di
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: spa
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1
Resumo: Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should “split the difference” between the epistemic peers’ opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers’ opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti–intuitive consequences conciliatory positions have. In particular, a semi-conciliatory view is not condemned to give incoherent instructions when applied to disagreement about it.
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spelling Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerenciaDesacuerdos, paridad epistémica e incoherenciaConciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should “split the difference” between the epistemic peers’ opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers’ opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti–intuitive consequences conciliatory positions have. In particular, a semi-conciliatory view is not condemned to give incoherent instructions when applied to disagreement about it.As posições conciliadoras acerca do desacordo sustentam que devemos “partilhar a diferença” entre as opiniões dos pares epistêmicos. Todavia, quando aplicadas ao desacordo de posições conciliadoras, resultam em instruções incoerentes. Uma posição semiconciliadora é aquela que aceita que as opiniões dos pares são parte do corpo de evidências relevantes nessas situações. Se adotamos este tipo de concepção, todos os casos que parecem favorecer concepções conciliatórias podem ser explicados, sem com isso nos comprometer com as consequências contra–intuitivas que as posições conciliatórias tem. Em particular, uma concepção semi-conciliadora não está condenada a dar instruções incoerentes quando aplicada a desacordos sobre ela mesma. Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2013-04-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p110.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 No. 1 (2013); 01-18Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 Núm. 1 (2013); 01-18Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 17 n. 1 (2013); 01-181808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCspahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1/26260Copyright (c) 2021 Federico Matías Pailos, Pablo Di Paoloinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPailos, Federico MatíasPaolo, Pablo Di2019-09-13T08:46:49Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/30473Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-13T08:46:49Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia
Desacuerdos, paridad epistémica e incoherencia
title Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia
spellingShingle Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia
Pailos, Federico Matías
title_short Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia
title_full Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia
title_fullStr Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia
title_full_unstemmed Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia
title_sort Desacuerdos, paridad epistêmica e inchoerencia
author Pailos, Federico Matías
author_facet Pailos, Federico Matías
Paolo, Pablo Di
author_role author
author2 Paolo, Pablo Di
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pailos, Federico Matías
Paolo, Pablo Di
description Conciliatory views on disagreement claim that one should “split the difference” between the epistemic peers’ opinions. Nevertheless, when they apply to the disagreement on conciliatory positions themselves, they give incoherent instructions. A semi-conciliatory position is one that accepts that the peers’ opinions are part of the whole body of evidence relevant in these situations. If one adopts this kind of view, all cases that seems to favor conciliatory views can be explained, and without compromising with the anti–intuitive consequences conciliatory positions have. In particular, a semi-conciliatory view is not condemned to give incoherent instructions when applied to disagreement about it.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2013-04-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1
10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p1/26260
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Federico Matías Pailos, Pablo Di Paolo
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Federico Matías Pailos, Pablo Di Paolo
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 No. 1 (2013); 01-18
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 17 Núm. 1 (2013); 01-18
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 17 n. 1 (2013); 01-18
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
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reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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