On the Principle of Excluded Middle
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2011 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333 |
Resumo: | I carry out in this paper a philosophical analysis of the principle of excluded middle (or, as it is often called in the version I favor here, principle of bivalence: any meaningful assertion is either true or false). This principle has been criticized, and sometimes rejected, on the charge that its validity depends on presuppositions that are not, some believe, universally obtainable; in particular, that any well-posed problem is solvable. My goal here is to show that, although excluded middle does indeed rest on certain presuppositions, they do not have the character of hypotheses that may or may not be true, or matters of fact that may or may not be the case. These presuppositions have, I claim, a transcendental character. Hence, the acceptance of excluded middle does not necessarily require, as some have claimed, an allegiance to ontological realism or some sort of cognitive optimism, construed as factual theses concerning the ontological status of domains of objects and our capability of accessing them cognitively. |
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Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
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On the Principle of Excluded MiddleOn the Principle of Excluded MiddleI carry out in this paper a philosophical analysis of the principle of excluded middle (or, as it is often called in the version I favor here, principle of bivalence: any meaningful assertion is either true or false). This principle has been criticized, and sometimes rejected, on the charge that its validity depends on presuppositions that are not, some believe, universally obtainable; in particular, that any well-posed problem is solvable. My goal here is to show that, although excluded middle does indeed rest on certain presuppositions, they do not have the character of hypotheses that may or may not be true, or matters of fact that may or may not be the case. These presuppositions have, I claim, a transcendental character. Hence, the acceptance of excluded middle does not necessarily require, as some have claimed, an allegiance to ontological realism or some sort of cognitive optimism, construed as factual theses concerning the ontological status of domains of objects and our capability of accessing them cognitively. Meu objetivo aqui é levar a cabo uma análise filosófica do princípio do terceiroexcluído ou princípio de bivalência: toda asserção com significado é ou verdadeira, ou falsa. Esse princípio tem sido criticado, e às vezes rejeitado, com o argumento que sua validade depende de pressupostos que não são, crêem alguns, universalmente válidos. Em particular, que qualquer problema bem posto pode ser resolvido. Eu quero mostrar que, ainda que o princípio dependa realmente de pressupostos, eles não têm o caráter de hipóteses que podem ou não ser verdadeiras, ou fatos que podem ou não ser o caso. Esses pressupostos têm, eu afirmo, natureza transcendental. Portanto, a aceitação do princípio do terceiro-excluído não requer, como alguns acreditam, compromissos com o realismo ontológico ou alguma forma de otimismo epistemológico, entendidos como teses sobre domínios de objetos e nossa capacidade de acessá-los cognitivamente. Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2011-05-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p33310.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 No. 2 (2011); 333Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 Núm. 2 (2011); 333Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 15 n. 2 (2011); 3331808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333/21047Copyright (c) 2021 Jairo José da Silvainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSilva, Jairo José da2019-09-12T11:23:51Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/23380Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-12T11:23:51Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
On the Principle of Excluded Middle On the Principle of Excluded Middle |
title |
On the Principle of Excluded Middle |
spellingShingle |
On the Principle of Excluded Middle Silva, Jairo José da |
title_short |
On the Principle of Excluded Middle |
title_full |
On the Principle of Excluded Middle |
title_fullStr |
On the Principle of Excluded Middle |
title_full_unstemmed |
On the Principle of Excluded Middle |
title_sort |
On the Principle of Excluded Middle |
author |
Silva, Jairo José da |
author_facet |
Silva, Jairo José da |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Silva, Jairo José da |
description |
I carry out in this paper a philosophical analysis of the principle of excluded middle (or, as it is often called in the version I favor here, principle of bivalence: any meaningful assertion is either true or false). This principle has been criticized, and sometimes rejected, on the charge that its validity depends on presuppositions that are not, some believe, universally obtainable; in particular, that any well-posed problem is solvable. My goal here is to show that, although excluded middle does indeed rest on certain presuppositions, they do not have the character of hypotheses that may or may not be true, or matters of fact that may or may not be the case. These presuppositions have, I claim, a transcendental character. Hence, the acceptance of excluded middle does not necessarily require, as some have claimed, an allegiance to ontological realism or some sort of cognitive optimism, construed as factual theses concerning the ontological status of domains of objects and our capability of accessing them cognitively. |
publishDate |
2011 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2011-05-24 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333 10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333 |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333/21047 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Jairo José da Silva info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2021 Jairo José da Silva |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 No. 2 (2011); 333 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 Núm. 2 (2011); 333 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 15 n. 2 (2011); 333 1808-1711 1414-4247 reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online) instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
instname_str |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
instacron_str |
UFSC |
institution |
UFSC |
reponame_str |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
collection |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br |
_version_ |
1789435112489746432 |