On the Principle of Excluded Middle

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Silva, Jairo José da
Data de Publicação: 2011
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333
Resumo: I carry out in this paper a philosophical analysis of the principle of excluded middle (or, as it is often called in the version I favor here, principle of bivalence: any meaningful assertion is either true or false). This principle has been criticized, and sometimes rejected, on the charge that its validity depends on presuppositions that are not, some believe, universally obtainable; in particular, that any well-posed problem is solvable. My goal here is to show that, although excluded middle does indeed rest on certain presuppositions, they do not have the character of hypotheses that may or may not be true, or matters of fact that may or may not be the case. These presuppositions have, I claim, a transcendental character. Hence, the acceptance of excluded middle does not necessarily require, as some have claimed, an allegiance to ontological realism or some sort of cognitive optimism, construed as factual theses concerning the ontological status of domains of objects and our capability of accessing them cognitively.  
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spelling On the Principle of Excluded MiddleOn the Principle of Excluded MiddleI carry out in this paper a philosophical analysis of the principle of excluded middle (or, as it is often called in the version I favor here, principle of bivalence: any meaningful assertion is either true or false). This principle has been criticized, and sometimes rejected, on the charge that its validity depends on presuppositions that are not, some believe, universally obtainable; in particular, that any well-posed problem is solvable. My goal here is to show that, although excluded middle does indeed rest on certain presuppositions, they do not have the character of hypotheses that may or may not be true, or matters of fact that may or may not be the case. These presuppositions have, I claim, a transcendental character. Hence, the acceptance of excluded middle does not necessarily require, as some have claimed, an allegiance to ontological realism or some sort of cognitive optimism, construed as factual theses concerning the ontological status of domains of objects and our capability of accessing them cognitively.  Meu objetivo aqui é levar a cabo uma análise filosófica do princípio do terceiroexcluído ou princípio de bivalência: toda asserção com significado é ou verdadeira, ou falsa. Esse princípio tem sido criticado, e às vezes rejeitado, com o argumento que sua validade depende de pressupostos que não são, crêem alguns, universalmente válidos. Em particular, que qualquer problema bem posto pode ser resolvido. Eu quero mostrar que, ainda que o princípio dependa realmente de pressupostos, eles não têm o caráter de hipóteses que podem ou não ser verdadeiras, ou fatos que podem ou não ser o caso. Esses pressupostos têm, eu afirmo, natureza transcendental. Portanto, a aceitação do princípio do terceiro-excluído não requer, como alguns acreditam, compromissos com o realismo ontológico ou alguma forma de otimismo epistemológico, entendidos como teses sobre domínios de objetos e nossa capacidade de acessá-los cognitivamente. Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2011-05-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p33310.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 No. 2 (2011); 333Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 Núm. 2 (2011); 333Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 15 n. 2 (2011); 3331808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCporhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333/21047Copyright (c) 2021 Jairo José da Silvainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSilva, Jairo José da2019-09-12T11:23:51Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/23380Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2019-09-12T11:23:51Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On the Principle of Excluded Middle
On the Principle of Excluded Middle
title On the Principle of Excluded Middle
spellingShingle On the Principle of Excluded Middle
Silva, Jairo José da
title_short On the Principle of Excluded Middle
title_full On the Principle of Excluded Middle
title_fullStr On the Principle of Excluded Middle
title_full_unstemmed On the Principle of Excluded Middle
title_sort On the Principle of Excluded Middle
author Silva, Jairo José da
author_facet Silva, Jairo José da
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Silva, Jairo José da
description I carry out in this paper a philosophical analysis of the principle of excluded middle (or, as it is often called in the version I favor here, principle of bivalence: any meaningful assertion is either true or false). This principle has been criticized, and sometimes rejected, on the charge that its validity depends on presuppositions that are not, some believe, universally obtainable; in particular, that any well-posed problem is solvable. My goal here is to show that, although excluded middle does indeed rest on certain presuppositions, they do not have the character of hypotheses that may or may not be true, or matters of fact that may or may not be the case. These presuppositions have, I claim, a transcendental character. Hence, the acceptance of excluded middle does not necessarily require, as some have claimed, an allegiance to ontological realism or some sort of cognitive optimism, construed as factual theses concerning the ontological status of domains of objects and our capability of accessing them cognitively.  
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011-05-24
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333
10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2011v15n2p333/21047
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Jairo José da Silva
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Jairo José da Silva
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 No. 2 (2011); 333
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 15 Núm. 2 (2011); 333
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 15 n. 2 (2011); 333
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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