Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Marechal, Patricia
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p141
Resumo: It has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice’s theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in abandoning the entailment from what is said to what is meant, and advancing a conception of the semantic notion of what is said that departs from speaker-hearers’ intuitions. This proposal has important consequences both concerning the evidence that should be used by philosophers of language when evaluating semantic theories, and the way we should carve up linguistic processing.
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spelling Minimalism and Phenomenological EvidenceMinimalism and Phenomenological EvidenceIt has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice’s theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in abandoning the entailment from what is said to what is meant, and advancing a conception of the semantic notion of what is said that departs from speaker-hearers’ intuitions. This proposal has important consequences both concerning the evidence that should be used by philosophers of language when evaluating semantic theories, and the way we should carve up linguistic processing.It has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice’s theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in abandoning the entailment from what is said to what is meant, and advancing a conception of the semantic notion of what is said that departs from speaker-hearers’ intuitions. This proposal has important consequences both concerning the evidence that should be used by philosophers of language when evaluating semantic theories, and the way we should carve up linguistic processing.Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC2017-11-16info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p14110.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p141Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 No. 1 (2017); 141-153Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 Núm. 1 (2017); 141-153Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 21 n. 1 (2017); 141-1531808-17111414-4247reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)instacron:UFSCenghttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p141/35806Copyright (c) 2021 Patricia Marechalinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMarechal, Patricia2018-02-11T11:46:26Zoai:periodicos.ufsc.br:article/50687Revistahttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principiaPUBhttps://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/oaiprincipia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br1808-17111414-4247opendoar:2018-02-11T11:46:26Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
title Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
spellingShingle Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
Marechal, Patricia
title_short Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
title_full Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
title_fullStr Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
title_full_unstemmed Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
title_sort Minimalism and Phenomenological Evidence
author Marechal, Patricia
author_facet Marechal, Patricia
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Marechal, Patricia
description It has been recently argued that the phenomenology of semantic perception casts doubts on Grice’s theory of meaning. I defend the psychological and theoretical plausibility of a form of Gricean minimalism, by setting new boundaries to the semantic-pragmatic distinction. This strategy consists in abandoning the entailment from what is said to what is meant, and advancing a conception of the semantic notion of what is said that departs from speaker-hearers’ intuitions. This proposal has important consequences both concerning the evidence that should be used by philosophers of language when evaluating semantic theories, and the way we should carve up linguistic processing.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-11-16
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p141
10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p141
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p141
identifier_str_mv 10.5007/1808-1711.2017v21n1p141
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2017v21n1p141/35806
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Patricia Marechal
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2021 Patricia Marechal
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Federal University of Santa Catarina – UFSC
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 No. 1 (2017); 141-153
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 21 Núm. 1 (2017); 141-153
Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 21 n. 1 (2017); 141-153
1808-1711
1414-4247
reponame:Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron:UFSC
instname_str Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
instacron_str UFSC
institution UFSC
reponame_str Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
collection Principia (Florianópolis. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Principia (Florianópolis. Online) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv principia@contato.ufsc.br||principia@contato.ufsc.br
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