Entre o justo e o legal: Ricoeur e a noção de justiça

• Autor(a) principal: Padilha, Rafael Alves
• Data de Publicação: 2012
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9114
• topic: Justiça; Teleologia; Deontologia; Sabedoria prática; Justice; Teleology; Deontology; Practical wisdow; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA

The present dissertation aims to reconstruct and to discuss Paul Ricoeur s argumentation about the notion of justice, presented at several books that had been published in the beginning and mid 90 , among them, Oneself as another, and the two collections of articles The just 1 and Readings 1: around the political. According to this, it takes as director axis the dialectic between teleology and deontology, with their respective predicates good and legal , seen by Ricoeur as a preparation for the real challenge of morality taken as a whole: the moral singular judgment, executed at uncertainty situations, under the sign of the practical wisdom. Under the teleological vision, the justice, with the providential intermediation of the Aristotelian s notion of friendship, is connected to the desire of a realized life, the ethic s aim. Further, yet with Aristotle, Ricoeur sees in the institution, grasped as a structure of desire to live together characterized by common wonts, the appropriated mediation to the distributive relations which it occurs under the aegis of justice. On the deontological plane, the discussion promoted with the Rawls s great work doesn t aim, properly, to refute it. In a diverse way, according to the thesis of the teleology s primacy over the deontology, what it intent is, at one hand, to extract a presupposed ethical sense, that the formalization of the rule of justice doesn t admit explicitly, and, at the other hand, to describe the tension provoked by the formalism, which conducts to necessity of a final recourse to the ethics itself. In the end, the phronesis s expedient, in your Aristotelian roots, aims the moral judgment s fundamental structure. Here, the paradigmatic example is offered by the judicial institution, which, in the judge s figure, judges the different demands and pronounces the justice, applying the law in a complex and not mechanical way, respecting their own rituals and obeying to public and recognized argumentation modes. The final point of this extensive trajectory is accomplished only when the act of judge is, finally, executed, distributing to each litigious part what is theirs by law, their fair share, contributing, in long term, to keep the social peace.