O princípio da diferença de John Rawls como alternativa ao utilitarismo na economia do bem-estar

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Neuberger, Daniele
Data de Publicação: 2015
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM
Texto Completo: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/6624
Resumo: This dissertation aims to show that the criticism of John Raws to utilitarianism and the proposition of his Theory of Justice, especially the difference principle, offer an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis for the welfare economics, by providing a safe way to arbitrate social and economic inequalities. According to the philosopher, by making the utility as the supreme good, utilitarianism concerns only with maximizing the total happiness, and disregards the way it is distribute among different individuals. When interpersonal utility comparisons were criticized for being considered normative, welfare economy found on the principle of efficiency considered one scientific way to assess the well-being and at the same time, keeping alive the utilitarian tradition. This principle, however, is also criticized by the author, since selects various positions as equally effective, and among which some people can live in abundance while others live in extreme poverty. In this sense, John Rawls proposes a theory of justice in an attempt to offer an alternative to utilitarian perspective. In this theory, individuals are driven to put in a hypothetical situation, called original position, which must decide on the principles that will govern the institutions of their society. The author states that the principles to be chosen in the original position would be, briefly, the principle of equal liberty and the principle of difference. According to the first principle, which has priority over the second, ensures an equal system of basic freedoms for all individuals and, according to the difference principle, social and economic inequalities are allowed only if they occur in favor of individuals less fortunate in society. It is argued that the Rawlsian theory, and especially the principle of difference, is an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis of welfare economics. This is because this principle ensures the well-being for all individuals in society, and not only that contribute most to the total satisfaction to increase, as proposed by utilitarianism. In this sense, if taken into account, these contributions would allow the welfare economy fill the gap left by the distributive utilitarianism, and to assess the well-being of individuals in order to guarantee them not only economic efficiency but also distributive justice.
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spelling 2015-11-122015-11-122015-03-27NEUBERGER, Daniele. THE JOHN RAWLS S DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO UTILITARIANISM IN WELFARE ECONOMICS. 2015. 99 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Economia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2015.http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/6624This dissertation aims to show that the criticism of John Raws to utilitarianism and the proposition of his Theory of Justice, especially the difference principle, offer an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis for the welfare economics, by providing a safe way to arbitrate social and economic inequalities. According to the philosopher, by making the utility as the supreme good, utilitarianism concerns only with maximizing the total happiness, and disregards the way it is distribute among different individuals. When interpersonal utility comparisons were criticized for being considered normative, welfare economy found on the principle of efficiency considered one scientific way to assess the well-being and at the same time, keeping alive the utilitarian tradition. This principle, however, is also criticized by the author, since selects various positions as equally effective, and among which some people can live in abundance while others live in extreme poverty. In this sense, John Rawls proposes a theory of justice in an attempt to offer an alternative to utilitarian perspective. In this theory, individuals are driven to put in a hypothetical situation, called original position, which must decide on the principles that will govern the institutions of their society. The author states that the principles to be chosen in the original position would be, briefly, the principle of equal liberty and the principle of difference. According to the first principle, which has priority over the second, ensures an equal system of basic freedoms for all individuals and, according to the difference principle, social and economic inequalities are allowed only if they occur in favor of individuals less fortunate in society. It is argued that the Rawlsian theory, and especially the principle of difference, is an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis of welfare economics. This is because this principle ensures the well-being for all individuals in society, and not only that contribute most to the total satisfaction to increase, as proposed by utilitarianism. In this sense, if taken into account, these contributions would allow the welfare economy fill the gap left by the distributive utilitarianism, and to assess the well-being of individuals in order to guarantee them not only economic efficiency but also distributive justice.A presente dissertação objetiva demonstrar que a crítica de John Raws ao utilitarismo e a proposição de sua Teoria da Justiça, sobretudo o princípio da diferença, oferecem uma alternativa ao utilitarismo enquanto base normativa da economia do bem-estar, ao proporcionar uma forma segura para arbitrar as desigualdades sociais e econômicas. De acordo com o filósofo, ao condicionar a utilidade como bem supremo, o utilitarismo importa-se apenas com a maximização da felicidade total, e desconsidera a forma pela qual ela é distribuída entre os diferentes indivíduos. Quando as comparações interpessoais de utilidade foram criticadas por serem consideradas normativas, a economia do bem-estar encontrou no princípio da eficiência uma forma considerada científica para avaliar o bem-estar e, ao mesmo tempo, manter viva a tradição utilitarista. Este princípio, porém, também é criticado pelo autor, uma vez que seleciona várias posições como igualmente eficientes, e dentre as quais algumas pessoas podem viver em grande abundância enquanto outras vivem na extrema miséria. Neste sentido, John Rawls propõe uma teoria da justiça, na tentativa de oferecer uma alternativa à perspectiva utilitarista. Nesta teoria, os indivíduos são levados a colocar-se em uma situação hipotética, denominada posição original, na qual devem deliberar sobre os princípios que irão regular as instituições de sua sociedade. O autor afirma que os princípios a serem escolhidos na posição original seriam, de forma sucinta, o princípio da liberdade igual e o princípio da diferença. De acordo com o primeiro princípio, que possui prioridade sobre o segundo, garante-se um igual sistema de liberdades básicas para todos os indivíduos e, de acordo com o princípio da diferença, as desigualdades econômicas e sociais são permitidas somente se ocorrerem em prol dos indivíduos menos favorecidos na sociedade. Argumenta-se que a teoria rawlsiana, e de modo especial o seu princípio da diferença, representam uma alternativa ao utilitarismo como base normativa da economia do bem-estar. Isto ocorre porque este princípio assegura o bem-estar a todos os indivíduos da sociedade, e não apenas aos que mais contribuem para aumentar a satisfação total, como proposto pelo utilitarismo. Neste sentido, se levadas em consideração, estas contribuições permitiriam que a economia do bem-estar preenchesse a lacuna distributiva deixada pelo utilitarismo, e avaliasse o bem-estar dos indivíduos de forma a lhes garantir não apenas a eficiência econômica, mas também a justiça distributiva.Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superiorapplication/pdfporUniversidade Federal de Santa MariaPrograma de Pós-Graduação em Economia e DesenvolvimentoUFSMBREconomiaUtilitarismoEconomia do bem-estarJohn RawlsPrincípio da diferençaUtilitarianismWellfare EconomicsJohn RawlsDifference principleCNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ECONOMIAO princípio da diferença de John Rawls como alternativa ao utilitarismo na economia do bem-estarThe John Rawls s difference principle as an alternative to utilitarianism in welfare economicsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisMarin, Solange Reginahttp://lattes.cnpq.br/9493893517579935Avila, Róber Iturriethttp://lattes.cnpq.br/2838368001826265Kühn, Daniela Diashttp://lattes.cnpq.br/5115809228865073http://lattes.cnpq.br/4375458369861302Neuberger, Daniele600300000000400300300300300aa81c7fd-da31-41e5-a0fe-2c5cbc0c7e76d280b811-122e-478a-aa42-936dae653fbaa43bf9d9-a759-42fd-afce-6f5471e93ff6ad2cfd13-9165-4d65-9ab0-698210d5ea1finfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSMinstname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)instacron:UFSMORIGINALNEUBERGER, DANIELE.pdfapplication/pdf1243626http://repositorio.ufsm.br/bitstream/1/6624/1/NEUBERGER%2c%20DANIELE.pdf8b7e469aed2e6767dc702678cbc6daafMD51TEXTNEUBERGER, DANIELE.pdf.txtNEUBERGER, DANIELE.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain249920http://repositorio.ufsm.br/bitstream/1/6624/2/NEUBERGER%2c%20DANIELE.pdf.txt074c7c191b1f73127c9be8568f6ca7fbMD52THUMBNAILNEUBERGER, DANIELE.pdf.jpgNEUBERGER, DANIELE.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg4859http://repositorio.ufsm.br/bitstream/1/6624/3/NEUBERGER%2c%20DANIELE.pdf.jpgc4bbd29d21b9391efa9307b11aaf4246MD531/66242022-01-12 12:08:48.38oai:repositorio.ufsm.br:1/6624Repositório Institucionalhttp://repositorio.ufsm.br/PUBhttp://repositorio.ufsm.br/oai/requestopendoar:39132022-01-12T15:08:48Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)false
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv O princípio da diferença de John Rawls como alternativa ao utilitarismo na economia do bem-estar
dc.title.alternative.eng.fl_str_mv The John Rawls s difference principle as an alternative to utilitarianism in welfare economics
title O princípio da diferença de John Rawls como alternativa ao utilitarismo na economia do bem-estar
spellingShingle O princípio da diferença de John Rawls como alternativa ao utilitarismo na economia do bem-estar
Neuberger, Daniele
Utilitarismo
Economia do bem-estar
John Rawls
Princípio da diferença
Utilitarianism
Wellfare Economics
John Rawls
Difference principle
CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ECONOMIA
title_short O princípio da diferença de John Rawls como alternativa ao utilitarismo na economia do bem-estar
title_full O princípio da diferença de John Rawls como alternativa ao utilitarismo na economia do bem-estar
title_fullStr O princípio da diferença de John Rawls como alternativa ao utilitarismo na economia do bem-estar
title_full_unstemmed O princípio da diferença de John Rawls como alternativa ao utilitarismo na economia do bem-estar
title_sort O princípio da diferença de John Rawls como alternativa ao utilitarismo na economia do bem-estar
author Neuberger, Daniele
author_facet Neuberger, Daniele
author_role author
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Marin, Solange Regina
dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/9493893517579935
dc.contributor.referee1.fl_str_mv Avila, Róber Iturriet
dc.contributor.referee1Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/2838368001826265
dc.contributor.referee2.fl_str_mv Kühn, Daniela Dias
dc.contributor.referee2Lattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/5115809228865073
dc.contributor.authorLattes.fl_str_mv http://lattes.cnpq.br/4375458369861302
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Neuberger, Daniele
contributor_str_mv Marin, Solange Regina
Avila, Róber Iturriet
Kühn, Daniela Dias
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Utilitarismo
Economia do bem-estar
John Rawls
Princípio da diferença
topic Utilitarismo
Economia do bem-estar
John Rawls
Princípio da diferença
Utilitarianism
Wellfare Economics
John Rawls
Difference principle
CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ECONOMIA
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Utilitarianism
Wellfare Economics
John Rawls
Difference principle
dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ECONOMIA
description This dissertation aims to show that the criticism of John Raws to utilitarianism and the proposition of his Theory of Justice, especially the difference principle, offer an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis for the welfare economics, by providing a safe way to arbitrate social and economic inequalities. According to the philosopher, by making the utility as the supreme good, utilitarianism concerns only with maximizing the total happiness, and disregards the way it is distribute among different individuals. When interpersonal utility comparisons were criticized for being considered normative, welfare economy found on the principle of efficiency considered one scientific way to assess the well-being and at the same time, keeping alive the utilitarian tradition. This principle, however, is also criticized by the author, since selects various positions as equally effective, and among which some people can live in abundance while others live in extreme poverty. In this sense, John Rawls proposes a theory of justice in an attempt to offer an alternative to utilitarian perspective. In this theory, individuals are driven to put in a hypothetical situation, called original position, which must decide on the principles that will govern the institutions of their society. The author states that the principles to be chosen in the original position would be, briefly, the principle of equal liberty and the principle of difference. According to the first principle, which has priority over the second, ensures an equal system of basic freedoms for all individuals and, according to the difference principle, social and economic inequalities are allowed only if they occur in favor of individuals less fortunate in society. It is argued that the Rawlsian theory, and especially the principle of difference, is an alternative to utilitarianism as a normative basis of welfare economics. This is because this principle ensures the well-being for all individuals in society, and not only that contribute most to the total satisfaction to increase, as proposed by utilitarianism. In this sense, if taken into account, these contributions would allow the welfare economy fill the gap left by the distributive utilitarianism, and to assess the well-being of individuals in order to guarantee them not only economic efficiency but also distributive justice.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2015-11-12
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2015-11-12
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2015-03-27
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/6624
identifier_str_mv NEUBERGER, Daniele. THE JOHN RAWLS S DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO UTILITARIANISM IN WELFARE ECONOMICS. 2015. 99 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Economia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2015.
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