Experiência e esquema conceitual em Strawson
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2011 |
Tipo de documento: | Dissertação |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
Texto Completo: | http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9098 |
Resumo: | In The Bounds of Sense, Strawson presents what he considers a major Kantian contribution to the analytic philosophy. This contribution corresponds to Kant‟s attempt to establish the general possible limits to the experience and therefore also to limit our use of concepts. According to the principle of significance, the limits of experience are limits to the significant use of concepts. In Individuals, Strawson develops the metaphysical project and takes into account many of the positive aspects found in Kant‟s theory, as it is the case of the empiricist principle of significance. In this metaphysical project, Strawson is interested in clarifying our thinking about the world this is made possible by the use of a single conceptual scheme. In the conceptual scheme the concepts are interconnected and these are the concepts that allow us to access things in the world. In his ontology a necessary condition for maintaining the conceptual scheme is the undisputed acceptance of the continued existence of some objects, Thus, Strawson is faced with the skeptic who doubts the continued existence of material bodies. The transcendental argument used in Individuals to show that skeptical doubt is incoherent he received criticism such as Barry Stroud. For Stroud the transcendental argument implies certain verificationism to assert the continued existence of particulars, but to accept the verificationism is to refute directly the skeptic, so that the transcendental argument becomes insufficient to refute skepticism. In Skepticism and Naturalism, Strawson accepts Stroud‟s criticism and he found in naturalism a way not to refute the skeptic, but just leave it aside, as it is natural to believe in the existence of material bodies and people. By embracing naturalism, Strawson gets closer of the realistic. He believes we can know things directly as they really are. This is possible because our sense perception is always permeated by concepts, so that, our sensitive knowledge is always conceptual. The concepts are learned in their practice of using, by observing the behavior of other users. Wherefore, when Strawson approaches Wittgenstein he gives a step ahead of Kant and he states that the concepts limit what we can know. Therefore, the basic features for a consistent conception of experience are agency and society and the limits to our knowledge are always set by the language. |
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Experiência e esquema conceitual em StrawsonExperience and conceptual scheme of StrawsonExperiênciaParticularesEsquema conceitualKantStrawsonExperienceParticularsConceptual schemeCNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIAIn The Bounds of Sense, Strawson presents what he considers a major Kantian contribution to the analytic philosophy. This contribution corresponds to Kant‟s attempt to establish the general possible limits to the experience and therefore also to limit our use of concepts. According to the principle of significance, the limits of experience are limits to the significant use of concepts. In Individuals, Strawson develops the metaphysical project and takes into account many of the positive aspects found in Kant‟s theory, as it is the case of the empiricist principle of significance. In this metaphysical project, Strawson is interested in clarifying our thinking about the world this is made possible by the use of a single conceptual scheme. In the conceptual scheme the concepts are interconnected and these are the concepts that allow us to access things in the world. In his ontology a necessary condition for maintaining the conceptual scheme is the undisputed acceptance of the continued existence of some objects, Thus, Strawson is faced with the skeptic who doubts the continued existence of material bodies. The transcendental argument used in Individuals to show that skeptical doubt is incoherent he received criticism such as Barry Stroud. For Stroud the transcendental argument implies certain verificationism to assert the continued existence of particulars, but to accept the verificationism is to refute directly the skeptic, so that the transcendental argument becomes insufficient to refute skepticism. In Skepticism and Naturalism, Strawson accepts Stroud‟s criticism and he found in naturalism a way not to refute the skeptic, but just leave it aside, as it is natural to believe in the existence of material bodies and people. By embracing naturalism, Strawson gets closer of the realistic. He believes we can know things directly as they really are. This is possible because our sense perception is always permeated by concepts, so that, our sensitive knowledge is always conceptual. The concepts are learned in their practice of using, by observing the behavior of other users. Wherefore, when Strawson approaches Wittgenstein he gives a step ahead of Kant and he states that the concepts limit what we can know. Therefore, the basic features for a consistent conception of experience are agency and society and the limits to our knowledge are always set by the language.Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível SuperiorEm The Bounds of Sense, Strawson apresenta o que considera como a grande contribuição kantiana para a filosofia analítica. Essa contribuição corresponde à tentativa de Kant em estabelecer os limites gerais possíveis para a experiência e, consequentemente, limitar também o uso que fazemos dos conceitos. De acordo com o princípio da significatividade, os limites da experiência são os limites para o uso significativo dos conceitos. Nos Individuals, Strawson desenvolve o projeto metafísico e leva em consideração muitos dos aspectos positivos encontrados na teoria de Kant, como é o caso do princípio empirista da significatividade. Neste projeto metafísico, Strawson tem o interesse de elucidar o nosso pensamento sobre o mundo, o que se torna possível pelo uso de um esquema conceitual único. No esquema conceitual, os conceitos encontram-se interligados entre si e são esses conceitos que nos possibilitam ter acesso às coisas no mundo. Na sua ontologia, uma condição necessária para a manutenção do esquema conceitual é a aceitação incontestável da existência contínua de alguns objetos. Com isso, Strawson depara-se com o cético que põe em dúvida a existência contínua dos corpos materiais. O argumento transcendental utilizado nos Individuals, para mostrar que a dúvida cética é incoerente, recebeu críticas tais como a de Barry Stroud. Para Stroud, o argumento transcendental implica certo verificacionismo para afirmar a existência contínua dos particulares, mas aceitar o verificacionismo já é refutar diretamente o cético, de modo que o argumento transcendental torna-se insuficiente para refutar o ceticismo. Em Ceticismo e Naturalismo, Strawson aceita a crítica de Stroud e encontra, no naturalismo, uma maneira de não refutar o cético, mas simplesmente deixá-lo de lado, já que é natural crer na existência dos corpos materiais e das pessoas. Ao adotar o naturalismo, Strawson aproxima-se ainda mais dos realistas. Ele considera que podemos conhecer as coisas diretamente como elas realmente são. Isso torna-se possível porque a nossa percepção sensível é sempre permeada por conceitos, de modo que o nosso conhecimento sensível é sempre conceitual. Os conceitos são apreendidos na sua prática de uso, através da observação do comportamento dos demais usuários. Desse modo, ao se aproximar de Wittgenstein, Strawson dá um passo a frente de Kant e afirma que os conceitos limitam aquilo que podemos conhecer. Assim, os traços fundamentais para uma concepção coerente de experiência são agência e sociedade, sendo que os limites para o nosso conhecimento são sempre estabelecidos pela linguagem.Universidade Federal de Santa MariaBRFilosofiaUFSMPrograma de Pós-Graduação em FilosofiaGallina, Albertinho Luizhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/0750109262601371Techio, Jônadashttp://lattes.cnpq.br/9435946545567859Sartori, Carlos Augustohttp://lattes.cnpq.br/6830220445412069Nunes, Cristina de Moraes2012-02-152012-02-152011-08-26info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisapplication/pdfapplication/pdfNUNES, Cristina de Moraes. Experience and conceptual scheme of Strawson. 2011. 100 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2011.http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9098porinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSMinstname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)instacron:UFSM2022-01-11T17:12:04Zoai:repositorio.ufsm.br:1/9098Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertaçõeshttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/ONGhttps://repositorio.ufsm.br/oai/requestatendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.comopendoar:2022-01-11T17:12:04Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Experiência e esquema conceitual em Strawson Experience and conceptual scheme of Strawson |
title |
Experiência e esquema conceitual em Strawson |
spellingShingle |
Experiência e esquema conceitual em Strawson Nunes, Cristina de Moraes Experiência Particulares Esquema conceitual Kant Strawson Experience Particulars Conceptual scheme CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
title_short |
Experiência e esquema conceitual em Strawson |
title_full |
Experiência e esquema conceitual em Strawson |
title_fullStr |
Experiência e esquema conceitual em Strawson |
title_full_unstemmed |
Experiência e esquema conceitual em Strawson |
title_sort |
Experiência e esquema conceitual em Strawson |
author |
Nunes, Cristina de Moraes |
author_facet |
Nunes, Cristina de Moraes |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Gallina, Albertinho Luiz http://lattes.cnpq.br/0750109262601371 Techio, Jônadas http://lattes.cnpq.br/9435946545567859 Sartori, Carlos Augusto http://lattes.cnpq.br/6830220445412069 |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Nunes, Cristina de Moraes |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Experiência Particulares Esquema conceitual Kant Strawson Experience Particulars Conceptual scheme CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
topic |
Experiência Particulares Esquema conceitual Kant Strawson Experience Particulars Conceptual scheme CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA |
description |
In The Bounds of Sense, Strawson presents what he considers a major Kantian contribution to the analytic philosophy. This contribution corresponds to Kant‟s attempt to establish the general possible limits to the experience and therefore also to limit our use of concepts. According to the principle of significance, the limits of experience are limits to the significant use of concepts. In Individuals, Strawson develops the metaphysical project and takes into account many of the positive aspects found in Kant‟s theory, as it is the case of the empiricist principle of significance. In this metaphysical project, Strawson is interested in clarifying our thinking about the world this is made possible by the use of a single conceptual scheme. In the conceptual scheme the concepts are interconnected and these are the concepts that allow us to access things in the world. In his ontology a necessary condition for maintaining the conceptual scheme is the undisputed acceptance of the continued existence of some objects, Thus, Strawson is faced with the skeptic who doubts the continued existence of material bodies. The transcendental argument used in Individuals to show that skeptical doubt is incoherent he received criticism such as Barry Stroud. For Stroud the transcendental argument implies certain verificationism to assert the continued existence of particulars, but to accept the verificationism is to refute directly the skeptic, so that the transcendental argument becomes insufficient to refute skepticism. In Skepticism and Naturalism, Strawson accepts Stroud‟s criticism and he found in naturalism a way not to refute the skeptic, but just leave it aside, as it is natural to believe in the existence of material bodies and people. By embracing naturalism, Strawson gets closer of the realistic. He believes we can know things directly as they really are. This is possible because our sense perception is always permeated by concepts, so that, our sensitive knowledge is always conceptual. The concepts are learned in their practice of using, by observing the behavior of other users. Wherefore, when Strawson approaches Wittgenstein he gives a step ahead of Kant and he states that the concepts limit what we can know. Therefore, the basic features for a consistent conception of experience are agency and society and the limits to our knowledge are always set by the language. |
publishDate |
2011 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2011-08-26 2012-02-15 2012-02-15 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
format |
masterThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
NUNES, Cristina de Moraes. Experience and conceptual scheme of Strawson. 2011. 100 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2011. http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9098 |
identifier_str_mv |
NUNES, Cristina de Moraes. Experience and conceptual scheme of Strawson. 2011. 100 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia) - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria, 2011. |
url |
http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9098 |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Maria BR Filosofia UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Maria BR Filosofia UFSM Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia |
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reponame:Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM instname:Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) instacron:UFSM |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
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Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
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Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM |
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Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM - Universidade Federal de Santa Maria (UFSM) |
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atendimento.sib@ufsm.br||tedebc@gmail.com |
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