Sellars e o mito do dado: uma avaliação de suas críticas ao fundacionismo em epistemologia

• Autor(a) principal: Daniel, Jonatan Willian
• Data de Publicação: 2014
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM
• dARK ID: ark:/26339/001300000ddjp
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9127
• topic: Wilfrid Sellars; Conhecimento; Fundacionismo; Mito do dado; Justificação; Wilfrid Sellars; Knowledge; Foundationalism; Myth of the given; Justification; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA

Wilfrid Sellars is well known for his criticism of what he called the myth of the given , which first appeared in his Empiricism and the philosophy of mind(1956).The given that is regarded as mythical by Sellars is the epistemic given with which foundationalists in epistemology intend to solve the epistemic regress problem. Sellars s criticisms of foundationalism had a strong repercussion in epistemology and soon become a reference in this field, mainly in virtue of having targeted the most basic features of foundationalism, questioning the very idea of immediate knowledge, which is at the core of any foundationalist account of knowledge. Sellars s criticism remain a challenge for foundationalism, and its significance has been highlighted by a growing number exegetical, critical, and Sellarsian inspired works. This dissertation comprieses three papers focused on Sellars s epistemology. The first paper shows how wide the reach of Sellarsian criticism on the myth of the given is. It also shows that Sellars s criticism of foundationalism can be presented in the form of a dilemma (known as Sellars s dilemma ) and how that dilemma, which does not appear explicitly in his work, can be found in his writings. The second paper presents an attempt by Laurence BonJour s to answer the challenge put to foundationalism by Sellars s dilemma. It assesses BonJour s more recent views on the matter, and shows thatthey do not answer the criticisms which himself endorsed when he was a coherentist. The third paper shows that if Sellars s views are coherent with and representing one of the culminations of the traditional analyses knowledge as justified true belief, and if his views are inadequate, then this could be evidence that we need an alternative in which knowledge is not analyzable in term of justification and other concepts but is a basic concept. We indicate, based on the work of Timothy Williamson and on a late piece by Sellars, how that alternative might turn out.