Idealismo transcendental e a gênese da idéia de liberdade na Crítica da Razão Pura de Kant

• Autor(a) principal: Mallmann, Rafael Barasuol
• Data de Publicação: 2007
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Manancial - Repositório Digital da UFSM
• dARK ID: ark:/26339/0013000009btt
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.ufsm.br/handle/1/9037
• topic: Idealismo transcendental; Antinomias da razão; Liberdade; Transcendental idealism; Antinomies of reason; Freedom; CNPQ::CIENCIAS HUMANAS::FILOSOFIA

The present dissertation has the purpose of exploring the conflict between natural causality and causality through freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason. More specifically from the Transcendental Dialectic, where the conflict is presented as an Antinomy of Reason, and from the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, where the notion of freedom is regarded as the nucleus of his moral thinking. Kant s critical reflection points out to a distinction which is essential for this work: the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, that is, the distinction between things as existing by themselves, independently from our faculty of knowing, and things such as they present themselves in the exercise of this faculty. Such distinction is the central thesis of the doctrine of Kantian Transcendental Idealism and provides a solution to the impasse of reason in the trial of making compatible the natural necessity (without which Science is not possible), with the possibility of an spontaneous causality, which would provide the genesis of the transcendental idea of freedom, and under which is founded freedom in a practical sense (without which moral is not possible). The central point of the present analysis indicates what Kant claims in the preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that conflict between nature and freedom does not exist, as the natural necessity belongs to the phenomenical ambit and the freedom (belongs) to the noumenal ambit.