Seguro depósito e Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2009 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | LOCUS Repositório Institucional da UFV |
Texto Completo: | http://locus.ufv.br/handle/123456789/117 |
Resumo: | Credit Unions are of notorious importance in the international financial scenario, and tends to potential growth in Brazil, moreover being an important instrument for the financial inclusion of small enterprises. However, in order to credit unions contribute for a contry’s development by means of offering financial services, it is crucial that a insurance deposit scheme is implemented towards the protection of its members, besides having a solid financial structure. In this sense, this research focuses the evaluation of the relationship between insurance deposit and moral hazard in the credit unions affiliated to the Sicoob-Brasil system. Aditionally, a case study was conducted for the unions xxvi affiliated to the Sicoob-Crediminas system, which introduced the insurance deposit scheme six years earlier. Chapter 1 focuses the evaluation of empirical evidences regarding the domination of borrowing or saving members in Brazilian credit unions affiliated to Sicoob-Brasil and Sicoob-Crediminas. In chapter 2, the insolvency probabilities of these cooperatives were estimated and used as one of the proxies for measuring moral hazard. Chapter 3 evaluates this issue in Brazilian credit unions, after the implementation of the Sicoob Insurance Fund, and also after the beginning of the Sicoob-Crediminas’ Insurance Deposit Fund. Panel regression analysis were implemented in chapters 1 and 3 while a logistic regression approach was used in chapter 2 in order to estimate the probabilities. The estimated results indicate that the credit unions filiated to the Sicoob-Brasil and to the Sicoob-Crediminas systems are dominated by borrowing members. Besides, the main determinants of the index of domination in the Brazilian credit unions were: “loan/member share capital”, “age”, “equity/total assets” and “operating expenses/total assets”. The average insolvency probabilities was 15% for the unions affiliated to Sicoob-Brasil and 5% for the Sicoob-Crediminas unions. The main determinants of insolvency were: a) Lost Loan Operations/ Total Loans; b) Net Institutional Capital/ Total Assets, c) Non-financial Investments/Total Assets, and d) Services Income/Operating Expenses. The results estimated in order to evaluate the existence of moral hazard problems in the credit unions affiliated to Sicoob-Brasil and Sicoob-Crediminas after the implementation of the Sicoob Insurance Fund and also after the Sicoob-Crediminas’ Insurance Deposit Fund, indicates that the insurance deposit did not generate moral hazard problems. At last, is was also verified that thedomination by borrowing members does not imply in an increase in risk in the analyzed members of both Brazilian credit union systems. |
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Bressan, Valéria Gama Fullyhttp://lattes.cnpq.br/0249079418500669Resende Filho, Moisés de Andradehttp://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4796349A6Lima, João Eustáquio dehttp://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4783228J6Braga, Marcelo Joséhttp://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4798666D3Pinheiro, Laura Edith Taboadahttp://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4162287E6Mattos, Leonardo Bornacki dehttp://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4735944Y0Silveira, Suely de Fátima Ramoshttp://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4704277E42015-03-19T19:35:04Z2009-12-012015-03-19T19:35:04Z2009-05-05BRESSAN, Valéria Gama Fully. Insurance deposit and Moral Hazard in brazilian credit unions. 2009. 400 f. Tese (Doutorado em Economia e Gerenciamento do Agronegócio; Economia das Relações Internacionais; Economia dos Recursos) - Universidade Federal de Viçosa, Viçosa, 2009.http://locus.ufv.br/handle/123456789/117Credit Unions are of notorious importance in the international financial scenario, and tends to potential growth in Brazil, moreover being an important instrument for the financial inclusion of small enterprises. However, in order to credit unions contribute for a contry’s development by means of offering financial services, it is crucial that a insurance deposit scheme is implemented towards the protection of its members, besides having a solid financial structure. In this sense, this research focuses the evaluation of the relationship between insurance deposit and moral hazard in the credit unions affiliated to the Sicoob-Brasil system. Aditionally, a case study was conducted for the unions xxvi affiliated to the Sicoob-Crediminas system, which introduced the insurance deposit scheme six years earlier. Chapter 1 focuses the evaluation of empirical evidences regarding the domination of borrowing or saving members in Brazilian credit unions affiliated to Sicoob-Brasil and Sicoob-Crediminas. In chapter 2, the insolvency probabilities of these cooperatives were estimated and used as one of the proxies for measuring moral hazard. Chapter 3 evaluates this issue in Brazilian credit unions, after the implementation of the Sicoob Insurance Fund, and also after the beginning of the Sicoob-Crediminas’ Insurance Deposit Fund. Panel regression analysis were implemented in chapters 1 and 3 while a logistic regression approach was used in chapter 2 in order to estimate the probabilities. The estimated results indicate that the credit unions filiated to the Sicoob-Brasil and to the Sicoob-Crediminas systems are dominated by borrowing members. Besides, the main determinants of the index of domination in the Brazilian credit unions were: “loan/member share capital”, “age”, “equity/total assets” and “operating expenses/total assets”. The average insolvency probabilities was 15% for the unions affiliated to Sicoob-Brasil and 5% for the Sicoob-Crediminas unions. The main determinants of insolvency were: a) Lost Loan Operations/ Total Loans; b) Net Institutional Capital/ Total Assets, c) Non-financial Investments/Total Assets, and d) Services Income/Operating Expenses. The results estimated in order to evaluate the existence of moral hazard problems in the credit unions affiliated to Sicoob-Brasil and Sicoob-Crediminas after the implementation of the Sicoob Insurance Fund and also after the Sicoob-Crediminas’ Insurance Deposit Fund, indicates that the insurance deposit did not generate moral hazard problems. At last, is was also verified that thedomination by borrowing members does not imply in an increase in risk in the analyzed members of both Brazilian credit union systems.O cooperativismo de crédito é de notória importância no cenário financeiro internacional e tem demonstrado potencial de crescimento no Brasil, além de ser um importante instrumento de inclusão de pequenos empreendimentos ao sistema financeiro. Todavia, para que as cooperativas de crédito possam fomentar o desenvolvimento do país, fornecendo serviços financeiros, é fundamental que elas possuam mecanismos de proteção dos depósitos dos seus associados, além de possuírem estruturas financeiras sólidas. Neste sentido, esta pesquisa teve como foco central avaliar a relação entre seguro depósito e Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito filiadas ao Sicoob-Brasil. Adicionalmente realizou-se um estudo empírico para as cooperativas filiadas ao Sicoob-Crediminas, devido à implementação do mecanismo de seguro depósito ter ocorrido seis anos antes do que no Sicoob-Brasil. No capítulo 1, foram avaliadas as evidências de dominação de membros tomadores ou de membros aplicadores de recursos nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras filiadas ao Sicoob-Brasil, assim como ao Sicoob-Crediminas. No capítulo 2, estimou-se a probabilidade de insolvência das cooperativas de crédito filiadas ao Sicoob-Brasil e ao Sicoob-Crediminas, que serviu como uma das proxies para o Moral Hazard. No capítulo 3, verificou-se a questão do Moral Hazard das cooperativas de crédito brasileiras após a implementação do Fundo Garantidor do Sicoob e do Fundo Garantidor de Depósitos no Sicoob-Crediminas. A metodologia utilizada nos capítulos 1 e 3 foi análise de dados em painel e, no capítulo 2, o modelo de regressão logística. Os resultados obtidos indicam que as cooperativas de crédito filiadas ao Sicoob-Brasil, assim como ao Sicoob-Crediminas apresentaram dominação por membros tomadores. Os principais determinantes do índice de dominação nas cooperativas brasileiras foram: “empréstimo/capital social”, “idade”, “patrimônio líquido ajustado/ativo total” e “despesas operacionais/ativo total”. As probabilidades de insolvência média geradas foram de 15% para as cooperativas filiadas ao Sicoob-Brasil e de 5% para as cooperativas filiadas ao Sicoob-Crediminas. E os principais determinantes da insolvência nas cooperativas de crédito foram: a) Operações de crédito vencidas /Carteira Classificada Total; b) Capital Institucional/ Ativo Total; c) Ativos não direcionados com a atividade fim da cooperativa/Ativo total; e d) Rendas de prestação de serviços /Despesas administrativas. Os resultados estimados para avaliar a existência do problema de Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito filiadas ao Sicoob-Brasil e ao Sicoob-Crediminas após a implantação do Fundo Garantidor do Sicoob e do Fundo Garantidor de Depósitos indicaram que o seguro depósito não gerou problemas de Moral Hazard. Por fim, constatou-se que tanto para o Sicoob-Brasil, quanto para o Sicoob-Crediminas, a dominação de membros tomadores não implicou aumento de risco nas cooperativas de crédito.Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológicoapplication/pdfporUniversidade Federal de ViçosaDoutorado em Economia AplicadaUFVBREconomia e Gerenciamento do Agronegócio; Economia das Relações Internacionais; Economia dos RecursosCooperativismo de créditoMoral HazardSeguro depósitoInsolvênviaDados em painelCredit unionsMoral HazardInsurance depositInsolvencyPanel regressionCNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ECONOMIA::ECONOMIA MONETARIA E FISCAL::INSTITUICOES MONETARIAS E FINANCEIRAS DO BRASILSeguro depósito e Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito brasileirasInsurance deposit and Moral Hazard in brazilian credit unionsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:LOCUS Repositório Institucional da UFVinstname:Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV)instacron:UFVORIGINALtexto completo.pdfapplication/pdf1489270https://locus.ufv.br//bitstream/123456789/117/1/texto%20completo.pdfd5c39540f5b911d2044776aaab4c302aMD51TEXTtexto completo.pdf.txttexto completo.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain688585https://locus.ufv.br//bitstream/123456789/117/2/texto%20completo.pdf.txt1a6ed7f271c6d351b0d2bfe4f1cf2c6dMD52THUMBNAILtexto completo.pdf.jpgtexto completo.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg3624https://locus.ufv.br//bitstream/123456789/117/3/texto%20completo.pdf.jpgd84cc2c0293514b80d6233dc419ead29MD53123456789/1172016-04-06 07:59:56.346oai:locus.ufv.br:123456789/117Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttps://www.locus.ufv.br/oai/requestfabiojreis@ufv.bropendoar:21452016-04-06T10:59:56LOCUS Repositório Institucional da UFV - Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV)false |
dc.title.por.fl_str_mv |
Seguro depósito e Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras |
dc.title.alternative.eng.fl_str_mv |
Insurance deposit and Moral Hazard in brazilian credit unions |
title |
Seguro depósito e Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras |
spellingShingle |
Seguro depósito e Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras Bressan, Valéria Gama Fully Cooperativismo de crédito Moral Hazard Seguro depósito Insolvênvia Dados em painel Credit unions Moral Hazard Insurance deposit Insolvency Panel regression CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ECONOMIA::ECONOMIA MONETARIA E FISCAL::INSTITUICOES MONETARIAS E FINANCEIRAS DO BRASIL |
title_short |
Seguro depósito e Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras |
title_full |
Seguro depósito e Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras |
title_fullStr |
Seguro depósito e Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras |
title_full_unstemmed |
Seguro depósito e Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras |
title_sort |
Seguro depósito e Moral Hazard nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras |
author |
Bressan, Valéria Gama Fully |
author_facet |
Bressan, Valéria Gama Fully |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.authorLattes.por.fl_str_mv |
http://lattes.cnpq.br/0249079418500669 |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Bressan, Valéria Gama Fully |
dc.contributor.advisor-co1.fl_str_mv |
Resende Filho, Moisés de Andrade |
dc.contributor.advisor-co1Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4796349A6 |
dc.contributor.advisor-co2.fl_str_mv |
Lima, João Eustáquio de |
dc.contributor.advisor-co2Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4783228J6 |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Braga, Marcelo José |
dc.contributor.advisor1Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4798666D3 |
dc.contributor.referee1.fl_str_mv |
Pinheiro, Laura Edith Taboada |
dc.contributor.referee1Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4162287E6 |
dc.contributor.referee2.fl_str_mv |
Mattos, Leonardo Bornacki de |
dc.contributor.referee2Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4735944Y0 |
dc.contributor.referee3.fl_str_mv |
Silveira, Suely de Fátima Ramos |
dc.contributor.referee3Lattes.fl_str_mv |
http://buscatextual.cnpq.br/buscatextual/visualizacv.do?id=K4704277E4 |
contributor_str_mv |
Resende Filho, Moisés de Andrade Lima, João Eustáquio de Braga, Marcelo José Pinheiro, Laura Edith Taboada Mattos, Leonardo Bornacki de Silveira, Suely de Fátima Ramos |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Cooperativismo de crédito Moral Hazard Seguro depósito Insolvênvia Dados em painel |
topic |
Cooperativismo de crédito Moral Hazard Seguro depósito Insolvênvia Dados em painel Credit unions Moral Hazard Insurance deposit Insolvency Panel regression CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ECONOMIA::ECONOMIA MONETARIA E FISCAL::INSTITUICOES MONETARIAS E FINANCEIRAS DO BRASIL |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Credit unions Moral Hazard Insurance deposit Insolvency Panel regression |
dc.subject.cnpq.fl_str_mv |
CNPQ::CIENCIAS SOCIAIS APLICADAS::ECONOMIA::ECONOMIA MONETARIA E FISCAL::INSTITUICOES MONETARIAS E FINANCEIRAS DO BRASIL |
description |
Credit Unions are of notorious importance in the international financial scenario, and tends to potential growth in Brazil, moreover being an important instrument for the financial inclusion of small enterprises. However, in order to credit unions contribute for a contry’s development by means of offering financial services, it is crucial that a insurance deposit scheme is implemented towards the protection of its members, besides having a solid financial structure. In this sense, this research focuses the evaluation of the relationship between insurance deposit and moral hazard in the credit unions affiliated to the Sicoob-Brasil system. Aditionally, a case study was conducted for the unions xxvi affiliated to the Sicoob-Crediminas system, which introduced the insurance deposit scheme six years earlier. Chapter 1 focuses the evaluation of empirical evidences regarding the domination of borrowing or saving members in Brazilian credit unions affiliated to Sicoob-Brasil and Sicoob-Crediminas. In chapter 2, the insolvency probabilities of these cooperatives were estimated and used as one of the proxies for measuring moral hazard. Chapter 3 evaluates this issue in Brazilian credit unions, after the implementation of the Sicoob Insurance Fund, and also after the beginning of the Sicoob-Crediminas’ Insurance Deposit Fund. Panel regression analysis were implemented in chapters 1 and 3 while a logistic regression approach was used in chapter 2 in order to estimate the probabilities. The estimated results indicate that the credit unions filiated to the Sicoob-Brasil and to the Sicoob-Crediminas systems are dominated by borrowing members. Besides, the main determinants of the index of domination in the Brazilian credit unions were: “loan/member share capital”, “age”, “equity/total assets” and “operating expenses/total assets”. The average insolvency probabilities was 15% for the unions affiliated to Sicoob-Brasil and 5% for the Sicoob-Crediminas unions. The main determinants of insolvency were: a) Lost Loan Operations/ Total Loans; b) Net Institutional Capital/ Total Assets, c) Non-financial Investments/Total Assets, and d) Services Income/Operating Expenses. The results estimated in order to evaluate the existence of moral hazard problems in the credit unions affiliated to Sicoob-Brasil and Sicoob-Crediminas after the implementation of the Sicoob Insurance Fund and also after the Sicoob-Crediminas’ Insurance Deposit Fund, indicates that the insurance deposit did not generate moral hazard problems. At last, is was also verified that thedomination by borrowing members does not imply in an increase in risk in the analyzed members of both Brazilian credit union systems. |
publishDate |
2009 |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2009-12-01 2015-03-19T19:35:04Z |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2009-05-05 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2015-03-19T19:35:04Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv |
BRESSAN, Valéria Gama Fully. Insurance deposit and Moral Hazard in brazilian credit unions. 2009. 400 f. Tese (Doutorado em Economia e Gerenciamento do Agronegócio; Economia das Relações Internacionais; Economia dos Recursos) - Universidade Federal de Viçosa, Viçosa, 2009. |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://locus.ufv.br/handle/123456789/117 |
identifier_str_mv |
BRESSAN, Valéria Gama Fully. Insurance deposit and Moral Hazard in brazilian credit unions. 2009. 400 f. Tese (Doutorado em Economia e Gerenciamento do Agronegócio; Economia das Relações Internacionais; Economia dos Recursos) - Universidade Federal de Viçosa, Viçosa, 2009. |
url |
http://locus.ufv.br/handle/123456789/117 |
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por |
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por |
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Universidade Federal de Viçosa |
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Doutorado em Economia Aplicada |
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UFV |
dc.publisher.country.fl_str_mv |
BR |
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Economia e Gerenciamento do Agronegócio; Economia das Relações Internacionais; Economia dos Recursos |
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Universidade Federal de Viçosa |
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reponame:LOCUS Repositório Institucional da UFV instname:Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV) instacron:UFV |
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