Anti-takeover Protection and Earnings Management: The Eternity Poison Pills Effect

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Azevedo, Yuri Gomes Paiva
Data de Publicação: 2020
Outros Autores: Tavares, Adilson de Lima, Mól, Anderson Luíz Rezende, Freitas Neto, Raimundo Marciano de
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
por
Título da fonte: Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
Texto Completo: https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2238
Resumo: Objective:This study aims to investigate whether eternity poison pills influence the earnings management level of Brazilian public companies.Method: We collect data from the bylaws obtained on the website of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, aiming to identify the use of poison pills and “eternity” clauses by 235 non-financial companies. The information needed to estimate discretionary accruals using the Jones Modified model, and the control variables included in the econometric model, were obtained through the Bloomberg® database. For the data analysis, we use quantile regression, considering the outliers present in the sample.Originality/Relevance: This study fills a gap in the literature regarding the effect of eternity poison pills on discretionary accruals, given that this relationship has not been explored in the Brazilian context. Thus, it is relevant for investors and regulators because it provides evidence on the effects of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.Results: The main results provide novel evidence on the relationship between poison pills and earnings management in the Brazilian context, demonstrating that this anti-takeover device, when associated with an “eternity” bylaw clause, is positively related to discretionary accruals.Theoretical contributions: It contributes theoretically by showing that the managerial entrenchment caused by the adoption of poison pills with “eternity” clauses may reduce the accounting information quality, shedding light for investors and regulators about this effect of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.    
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spelling Anti-takeover Protection and Earnings Management: The Eternity Poison Pills EffectProteção Anti-takeover e Gerenciamento de Resultados: O Efeito das Poison Pills com Cláusulas PétreasPoison PillsEarnings ManagementAnti-takeover Devices.Poison PillsGerenciamento de ResultadosDispositivos Anti-Takeover.Objective:This study aims to investigate whether eternity poison pills influence the earnings management level of Brazilian public companies.Method: We collect data from the bylaws obtained on the website of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, aiming to identify the use of poison pills and “eternity” clauses by 235 non-financial companies. The information needed to estimate discretionary accruals using the Jones Modified model, and the control variables included in the econometric model, were obtained through the Bloomberg® database. For the data analysis, we use quantile regression, considering the outliers present in the sample.Originality/Relevance: This study fills a gap in the literature regarding the effect of eternity poison pills on discretionary accruals, given that this relationship has not been explored in the Brazilian context. Thus, it is relevant for investors and regulators because it provides evidence on the effects of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.Results: The main results provide novel evidence on the relationship between poison pills and earnings management in the Brazilian context, demonstrating that this anti-takeover device, when associated with an “eternity” bylaw clause, is positively related to discretionary accruals.Theoretical contributions: It contributes theoretically by showing that the managerial entrenchment caused by the adoption of poison pills with “eternity” clauses may reduce the accounting information quality, shedding light for investors and regulators about this effect of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.    Objetivo: Este estudo tem por objetivo investigar se as poison pills com cláusulas pétreas exercem influência no nível de gerenciamento de resultados das companhias abertas brasileiras.Método: A coleta de dados foi realizada a partir dos estatutos sociais obtidos no sítio eletrônico da Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), visando identificar a utilização de poison pills e cláusulas pétreas por 235 companhias não financeiras. As informações necessárias para a estimação dos accruals discricionários por meio do modelo Jones Modificado e as variáveis de controle inseridas no modelo econométrico foram obtidas por meio da base de dados Bloomberg®. Para a análise de dados, optou-se pela regressão quantílica, tendo em vista os diversos outliers presentes na amostra.Originalidade/Relevância: Esta pesquisa preenche uma lacuna na literatura no que concerne ao efeito das poison pills com cláusulas pétreas sobre os accruals discricionários, já que essa relação ainda não foi explorada no contexto brasileiro. Assim, torna-se relevante porque fornece a investidores e reguladores indícios dos efeitos da implementação desse mecanismo anti-takeover.Resultados: Os principais resultados apresentam novas evidências acerca da relação entre as poison pills e o gerenciamento de resultados no contexto brasileiro, ao demonstrar que esse dispositivo anti-takeover, quando aliado a uma cláusula estatutária pétrea, apresenta-se positivamente relacionado com os accruals discricionários.Contribuições teóricas: Contribui com a literatura ao sinalizar que o entrincheiramento gerencial propiciado pela adoção das poison pills com cláusulas pétreas pode influenciar a redução da qualidade das informações contábeis reportadas pelas companhias, esclarecendo investidores e reguladores sobre o efeito da implementação desse mecanismo anti-takeover.      Contabilidade Gestão e Governança2020-12-21info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/223810.51341/1984-3925_2020v23n3a4Contabilidade Gestão e Governança; v. 23 n. 3 (2020); 345-3631984-39251984-3925reponame:Contabilidade, Gestão e Governançainstname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)instacron:UNBengporhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2238/PDF_Enhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2238/PDF_PtCopyright (c) 2020 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governançainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAzevedo, Yuri Gomes PaivaTavares, Adilson de LimaMól, Anderson Luíz RezendeFreitas Neto, Raimundo Marciano de2022-09-22T08:50:22Zoai:oai.jamg.cloud:article/2238Revistahttp://www.revistacgg.org/index.php/contabilPUBhttps://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/oaijamg.cgg@gmail.com1516-70111984-3925opendoar:2022-09-22T08:50:22Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Anti-takeover Protection and Earnings Management: The Eternity Poison Pills Effect
Proteção Anti-takeover e Gerenciamento de Resultados: O Efeito das Poison Pills com Cláusulas Pétreas
title Anti-takeover Protection and Earnings Management: The Eternity Poison Pills Effect
spellingShingle Anti-takeover Protection and Earnings Management: The Eternity Poison Pills Effect
Azevedo, Yuri Gomes Paiva
Poison Pills
Earnings Management
Anti-takeover Devices.
Poison Pills
Gerenciamento de Resultados
Dispositivos Anti-Takeover.
title_short Anti-takeover Protection and Earnings Management: The Eternity Poison Pills Effect
title_full Anti-takeover Protection and Earnings Management: The Eternity Poison Pills Effect
title_fullStr Anti-takeover Protection and Earnings Management: The Eternity Poison Pills Effect
title_full_unstemmed Anti-takeover Protection and Earnings Management: The Eternity Poison Pills Effect
title_sort Anti-takeover Protection and Earnings Management: The Eternity Poison Pills Effect
author Azevedo, Yuri Gomes Paiva
author_facet Azevedo, Yuri Gomes Paiva
Tavares, Adilson de Lima
Mól, Anderson Luíz Rezende
Freitas Neto, Raimundo Marciano de
author_role author
author2 Tavares, Adilson de Lima
Mól, Anderson Luíz Rezende
Freitas Neto, Raimundo Marciano de
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Azevedo, Yuri Gomes Paiva
Tavares, Adilson de Lima
Mól, Anderson Luíz Rezende
Freitas Neto, Raimundo Marciano de
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Poison Pills
Earnings Management
Anti-takeover Devices.
Poison Pills
Gerenciamento de Resultados
Dispositivos Anti-Takeover.
topic Poison Pills
Earnings Management
Anti-takeover Devices.
Poison Pills
Gerenciamento de Resultados
Dispositivos Anti-Takeover.
description Objective:This study aims to investigate whether eternity poison pills influence the earnings management level of Brazilian public companies.Method: We collect data from the bylaws obtained on the website of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission, aiming to identify the use of poison pills and “eternity” clauses by 235 non-financial companies. The information needed to estimate discretionary accruals using the Jones Modified model, and the control variables included in the econometric model, were obtained through the Bloomberg® database. For the data analysis, we use quantile regression, considering the outliers present in the sample.Originality/Relevance: This study fills a gap in the literature regarding the effect of eternity poison pills on discretionary accruals, given that this relationship has not been explored in the Brazilian context. Thus, it is relevant for investors and regulators because it provides evidence on the effects of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.Results: The main results provide novel evidence on the relationship between poison pills and earnings management in the Brazilian context, demonstrating that this anti-takeover device, when associated with an “eternity” bylaw clause, is positively related to discretionary accruals.Theoretical contributions: It contributes theoretically by showing that the managerial entrenchment caused by the adoption of poison pills with “eternity” clauses may reduce the accounting information quality, shedding light for investors and regulators about this effect of implementing this anti-takeover mechanism.    
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-12-21
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2238
10.51341/1984-3925_2020v23n3a4
url https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2238
identifier_str_mv 10.51341/1984-3925_2020v23n3a4
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
por
language eng
por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2238/PDF_En
https://revistacgg.org/index.php/contabil/article/view/2238/PDF_Pt
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Revista Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Contabilidade Gestão e Governança
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Contabilidade Gestão e Governança
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Contabilidade Gestão e Governança; v. 23 n. 3 (2020); 345-363
1984-3925
1984-3925
reponame:Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
instname:Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron:UNB
instname_str Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
instacron_str UNB
institution UNB
reponame_str Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
collection Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança
repository.name.fl_str_mv Contabilidade, Gestão e Governança - Universidade de Brasília (UnB)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv jamg.cgg@gmail.com
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