Beyond Brazilian coalition presidentialism : the appropriation of the legislative agenda

• Autor(a) principal: Silva, Rafael Silveira e
• Data de Publicação: 2014
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da UnB
• Texto Completo: http://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/29431; https://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1981-38212014000100022
• topic: Presidencialismo; Poder Executivo; Poder Legislativo

Even though they possess several power resources, Brazilian Presidents also elaborate their legislative proposals based upon bills already being processed in Congress through a phenomenon called Appropriation of the legislative agenda. In this paper I examine the conditions under which this phenomenon occurs by means of a typology and a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). I conclude that Appropriation provides the President with the expansion of the formal support base by controlling the agenda of allied and opposition parties as well as obtaining the "paternity" of several policies already in motion in Congress, thus enabling a public association of the President's actions and his or her party with the possibility of social benefits. Be it in the pursuit of promising agendas or for the maintenance of their own dominance, Appropriation shows that Brazilian Presidents must go beyond coalition presidentialism.