Hume: causal theory of freedom and indeterminism

• Autor(a) principal: Pereira Júnior, Alfredo
• Data de Publicação: 1993
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Trans/Form/Ação (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/12369
• topic: Indeterminism; causality; Freedom; Necessity; Chance; Indeterminismo; Causalidade; Liberdade; Necessidade; Acaso

Although Hume seems to suppose that natural processes occur in a deterministic way, his conception of causality prohibits us from knowing them as deterministic. The reason is that for him the idea of a necessary connection between events is purely psychological. In our analysis of this question, we argue that: a) in his main references about causality, Hume does not assume a strong ontological commitment with determinism; b) certain parts of his texts suggest that indeterminism is non eliminable, in the knowledge of nature; and c) his causal conception of freedom supposes indeterminism in natural processes, and not in our knowledge of them only.