Neutral perspectivism and the biological function of phenomenal experiences

• Autor(a) principal: Stein, Sofia Inês Albornoz
• Data de Publicação: 2023
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Trans/Form/Ação (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/13676
• topic: Perspectivismo neutro; Experiências fenomênicas conscientes; Teorias da percepção; Biologia evolucionista; Neurociências; Neutral perspectivism; Conscious phenomenal experiences; Theories of perception; Evolutionary biology; Neurosciences

In this paper, I argue in favor of a view on the nature of the human mind that is neither a reductionist physicalism nor any kind of dualism, whether of substance or property. I support neutral perspectivism, inspired by neutral monism, with a scientific and materialist content, which allows for the inclusion of conscious phenomenal experiences as part of causal chains of perceptive, emotional, cognitive and deliberative processes. Although there are still no theories, laws and data that allow a final decision on the role of conscious phenomenal experiences in physical-chemical processes in the body, evidence collected in recent decades does not only strengthen our belief in the correlation between physical-chemical events and qualitative conscious experiences but also increases the number of reasons in favor of the thesis that these experiences do have an important functional role in the processes of collection and use of information by the organism.