The anti-representationalist character of cognition in Merleau-Ponty's thought

• Autor(a) principal: Bouyer, Gilbert Cardoso
• Data de Publicação: 2022
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Trans/Form/Ação (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://revistas.marilia.unesp.br/index.php/transformacao/article/view/7606
• topic: Merleau-Ponty; Representação mental; Ciência cognitiva; Merleau-Ponty; Mental representation; Cognitive science

This article defends the view that the foundations of contemporary cognitive science (CC) are in tune with Merleau-Ponty's thinking in its anti-objectivist and anti-representationalist aspects. The idea of mental representation is contested both in CC and in Merleau-Ponty's thinking. Cognition does not mirror an outside world independent of embodied subjects. The world is an existential one as Merleau-Ponty and the CC say. The mental representation hypothesis assumes that the world can be perceived independently of the perceiving subject. This is not true. Perception depends on how the subject acts in his perceived world. All the stimulations that the organism finds are only possible by its previous movements that result in the exposure of the receiving organ to external influences. The sensory stimuli that the organism finds depend directly on its motor behavior and the way the organism moves depends directly on the sensory consequences of its previous behaviors