Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Brito, Evandro Oliveira
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista de Filosofia da UNESP
Texto Completo: http://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6403
Resumo: The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889. As a textual basis, I take Brentano’s communication, presented to the philosophical community of Vienna in March 1889, entitled “On the concept of truth” (Über den Begriff der Wahrheit), and I provide a systematic exposition of Brentano’s analysis of the problems surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. My analysis explains how Brentano reinterpreted the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence within the conceptual framework of his descriptive psychology.
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spelling Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truthThe purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889. As a textual basis, I take Brentano’s communication, presented to the philosophical community of Vienna in March 1889, entitled “On the concept of truth” (Über den Begriff der Wahrheit), and I provide a systematic exposition of Brentano’s analysis of the problems surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. My analysis explains how Brentano reinterpreted the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence within the conceptual framework of his descriptive psychology.The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889. As a textual basis, I take Brentano’s communication, presented to the philosophical community of Vienna in March 1889, entitled “On the concept of truth” (Über den Begriff der Wahrheit), and I provide a systematic exposition of Brentano’s analysis of the problems surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. My analysis explains how Brentano reinterpreted the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence within the conceptual framework of his descriptive psychology.TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de FilosofiaTRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia2018-10-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/640310.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41n3.03.p39TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol 41 No 3 (2018); 39-56TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 3 (2018); 39-560101-31730101-3173reponame:Revista de Filosofia da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPporhttp://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6403/5253Brito, Evandro Oliveirainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2020-08-04T10:42:43Zoai:ojs.www2.marilia.unesp.br:article/6403Revistahttp://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/oai1980-539X0101-3173opendoar:null2020-08-04 10:42:44.021Revista de Filosofia da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth
title Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth
spellingShingle Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth
Brito, Evandro Oliveira
title_short Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth
title_full Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth
title_fullStr Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth
title_full_unstemmed Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth
title_sort Franz Brentano’s theory of judgment (1889): a critique of Aristotle’s correspondence theory of truth
author Brito, Evandro Oliveira
author_facet Brito, Evandro Oliveira
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Brito, Evandro Oliveira
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889. As a textual basis, I take Brentano’s communication, presented to the philosophical community of Vienna in March 1889, entitled “On the concept of truth” (Über den Begriff der Wahrheit), and I provide a systematic exposition of Brentano’s analysis of the problems surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. My analysis explains how Brentano reinterpreted the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence within the conceptual framework of his descriptive psychology.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889. As a textual basis, I take Brentano’s communication, presented to the philosophical community of Vienna in March 1889, entitled “On the concept of truth” (Über den Begriff der Wahrheit), and I provide a systematic exposition of Brentano’s analysis of the problems surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. My analysis explains how Brentano reinterpreted the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence within the conceptual framework of his descriptive psychology.
description The purpose of this paper is to discuss the concept of truth formulated by Franz Brentano in 1889. As a textual basis, I take Brentano’s communication, presented to the philosophical community of Vienna in March 1889, entitled “On the concept of truth” (Über den Begriff der Wahrheit), and I provide a systematic exposition of Brentano’s analysis of the problems surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence. My analysis explains how Brentano reinterpreted the Aristotelian concept of truth as correspondence within the conceptual framework of his descriptive psychology.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-10-31
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6403
10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41n3.03.p39
url http://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6403
identifier_str_mv 10.1590/0101-3173.2018.v41n3.03.p39
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
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dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6403/5253
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol 41 No 3 (2018); 39-56
TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; v. 41 n. 3 (2018); 39-56
0101-3173
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