INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: CHEDIAK, Karla
Data de Publicação: 2016
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista de Filosofia da UNESP
Texto Completo: http://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6014
Resumo: In this paper, I intend to review the intentionalist account of perceptual experiencein order to deal with some difficulties that it faces in adequately specifying the nature and object ofperceptual experience. My aim is to show that it is possible for the intentionalists to incorporate thedisjunctivist thesis that the object of perception is part of perceptual experiences, without renouncingthe common factor principle. I argue that, in order to do this, it is necessary to engage with the conceptof biological function and to review the concept of a perceptual object.
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spelling INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTIONIn this paper, I intend to review the intentionalist account of perceptual experiencein order to deal with some difficulties that it faces in adequately specifying the nature and object ofperceptual experience. My aim is to show that it is possible for the intentionalists to incorporate thedisjunctivist thesis that the object of perception is part of perceptual experiences, without renouncingthe common factor principle. I argue that, in order to do this, it is necessary to engage with the conceptof biological function and to review the concept of a perceptual object.TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de FilosofiaTRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia2016-06-03info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttp://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6014TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol 39 No 02 (2016)TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; v. 39 n. 02 (2016)0101-31730101-3173reponame:Revista de Filosofia da UNESPinstname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)instacron:UNESPporhttp://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6014/4020CHEDIAK, Karlainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2020-08-04T10:42:41Zoai:ojs.www2.marilia.unesp.br:article/6014Revistahttp://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/oai1980-539X0101-3173opendoar:null2020-08-04 10:42:42.045Revista de Filosofia da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION
title INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION
spellingShingle INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION
CHEDIAK, Karla
title_short INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION
title_full INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION
title_fullStr INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION
title_full_unstemmed INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION
title_sort INTENTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE OBJECT OF PERCEPTION
author CHEDIAK, Karla
author_facet CHEDIAK, Karla
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv CHEDIAK, Karla
dc.description.none.fl_txt_mv In this paper, I intend to review the intentionalist account of perceptual experiencein order to deal with some difficulties that it faces in adequately specifying the nature and object ofperceptual experience. My aim is to show that it is possible for the intentionalists to incorporate thedisjunctivist thesis that the object of perception is part of perceptual experiences, without renouncingthe common factor principle. I argue that, in order to do this, it is necessary to engage with the conceptof biological function and to review the concept of a perceptual object.
description In this paper, I intend to review the intentionalist account of perceptual experiencein order to deal with some difficulties that it faces in adequately specifying the nature and object ofperceptual experience. My aim is to show that it is possible for the intentionalists to incorporate thedisjunctivist thesis that the object of perception is part of perceptual experiences, without renouncingthe common factor principle. I argue that, in order to do this, it is necessary to engage with the conceptof biological function and to review the concept of a perceptual object.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-06-03
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6014
url http://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6014
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www2.marilia.unesp.br/revistas/index.php/transformacao/article/view/6014/4020
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
publisher.none.fl_str_mv TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; Vol 39 No 02 (2016)
TRANS/FORM/AÇÃO: Revista de Filosofia; v. 39 n. 02 (2016)
0101-3173
0101-3173
reponame:Revista de Filosofia da UNESP
instname:Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
instacron:UNESP
reponame_str Revista de Filosofia da UNESP
collection Revista de Filosofia da UNESP
instname_str Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
instacron_str UNESP
institution UNESP
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Filosofia da UNESP - Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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