Intra-ministerial changes and coalition management: Brazil, 1990-2014

• Autor(a) principal: Guerra, Rosiene
• Data de Publicação: 2019
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Opinião Pública (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/op/article/view/8658121
• topic: Presidentialism; Coalition; Executive branch; Structural changes; Departments.; Presidencialismo; Coalición; Poder ejecutivo; Cambios estructurales; Ministerios.; Presidencialismo; Coalizão; Poder executivo; Mudanças estruturais; Ministérios.

This paper analyzes the changes in the internal structure of the departments of the Brazilian Executive Branch between 1990 and 2014. The general argument is that in coalition presidentialism, the president positions himself in a complex delegation network in which he faces several agency costs and, to deal with this, relies on a toolbox. The literature points to some of these tools; however, administrative power, related to the structural dimension of the departments, has remained underexplored. In this sense, the article aims to contribute to this debate by answering the following question: what factors influenced the structural changes in the departments of the Brazilian executive in the years 1990 to 2014? In other words, is administrative power a resource used by the president to deal with agency costs stemming from her relationship to coalition parties? What other factors might influence the president's decision to use such power? This longitudinal study is explanatory and takes a quantitative approach. The results show that the president cautiously uses his administrative power of agency design to strengthen the structures of the most salient departments to his agenda and of the more institutionalized departments.