Free believers
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2002 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644648 |
Resumo: | Is there such a thing as free belief? This paper is not about free expression of belief or free speech. It is about freedom of belief as a mental state. In the sense in which the believer would be the cause of his or her own belief, and could believe at will, it is, for well-known reasons, impossible. Some writers, however, like McDowell, have argued, in a Kantian spirit, that obeying the norms of thought and setting oneself as a member of the “space of reasons” could provide the appropriate notion of free belief. Their account is based on the idea that a reflexive believer is automatically a free believer. I argue that this is wrong. There is no appropriate notion of free belief in this sense, although this does not show that one cannot be responsible for one’s belief. |
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Free believersBeliefFreedomReflectionDoxastic voluntarismResponsibilityIs there such a thing as free belief? This paper is not about free expression of belief or free speech. It is about freedom of belief as a mental state. In the sense in which the believer would be the cause of his or her own belief, and could believe at will, it is, for well-known reasons, impossible. Some writers, however, like McDowell, have argued, in a Kantian spirit, that obeying the norms of thought and setting oneself as a member of the “space of reasons” could provide the appropriate notion of free belief. Their account is based on the idea that a reflexive believer is automatically a free believer. I argue that this is wrong. There is no appropriate notion of free belief in this sense, although this does not show that one cannot be responsible for one’s belief.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2002-03-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644648Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 3 (2002): Mar.; 155-175Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 3 (2002): Mar.; 155-175Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 3 (2002): Mar.; 155-1752317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644648/12014França; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessEngel, Pascal2022-05-27T17:20:50Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644648Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-05-27T17:20:50Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Free believers |
title |
Free believers |
spellingShingle |
Free believers Engel, Pascal Belief Freedom Reflection Doxastic voluntarism Responsibility |
title_short |
Free believers |
title_full |
Free believers |
title_fullStr |
Free believers |
title_full_unstemmed |
Free believers |
title_sort |
Free believers |
author |
Engel, Pascal |
author_facet |
Engel, Pascal |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Engel, Pascal |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Belief Freedom Reflection Doxastic voluntarism Responsibility |
topic |
Belief Freedom Reflection Doxastic voluntarism Responsibility |
description |
Is there such a thing as free belief? This paper is not about free expression of belief or free speech. It is about freedom of belief as a mental state. In the sense in which the believer would be the cause of his or her own belief, and could believe at will, it is, for well-known reasons, impossible. Some writers, however, like McDowell, have argued, in a Kantian spirit, that obeying the norms of thought and setting oneself as a member of the “space of reasons” could provide the appropriate notion of free belief. Their account is based on the idea that a reflexive believer is automatically a free believer. I argue that this is wrong. There is no appropriate notion of free belief in this sense, although this does not show that one cannot be responsible for one’s belief. |
publishDate |
2002 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2002-03-31 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644648 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644648 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644648/12014 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
França; Contemporâneo |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 3 (2002): Mar.; 155-175 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 3 (2002): Mar.; 155-175 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 3 (2002): Mar.; 155-175 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566563864576 |