BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: KOZIOLEK,NICHOLAS
Data de Publicação: 2018
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400287
Resumo: Abstract Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s an actualization of its subject’s rational capacities or (ii) that it’s a rational activity (hence, a certain kind of event). And, though belief is not an act of reason in the second sense, it may nonetheless be one in the first: it may be a static actualization of its subject’s rational capacities.
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spelling BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASONBeliefDoxastic AgencyOntology of BeliefAbstract Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s an actualization of its subject’s rational capacities or (ii) that it’s a rational activity (hence, a certain kind of event). And, though belief is not an act of reason in the second sense, it may nonetheless be one in the first: it may be a static actualization of its subject’s rational capacities.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2018-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400287Manuscrito v.41 n.4 2018reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.nkinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessKOZIOLEK,NICHOLASeng2018-12-04T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452018000400287Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-12-04T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON
title BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON
spellingShingle BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON
KOZIOLEK,NICHOLAS
Belief
Doxastic Agency
Ontology of Belief
title_short BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON
title_full BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON
title_fullStr BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON
title_full_unstemmed BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON
title_sort BELIEF AS AN ACT OF REASON
author KOZIOLEK,NICHOLAS
author_facet KOZIOLEK,NICHOLAS
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv KOZIOLEK,NICHOLAS
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Belief
Doxastic Agency
Ontology of Belief
topic Belief
Doxastic Agency
Ontology of Belief
description Abstract Most philosophers assume (often without argument) that belief is a mental state. Call their view the orthodoxy. In a pair of recent papers, Matthew Boyle has argued that the orthodoxy is mistaken: belief is not a state but (as I like to put it) an act of reason. I argue here that at least part of his disagreement with the orthodoxy rests on an equivocation. For to say that belief is an act of reason might mean either (i) that it’s an actualization of its subject’s rational capacities or (ii) that it’s a rational activity (hence, a certain kind of event). And, though belief is not an act of reason in the second sense, it may nonetheless be one in the first: it may be a static actualization of its subject’s rational capacities.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-12-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400287
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000400287
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n4.nk
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito v.41 n.4 2018
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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