Frege’s horizontal and the liar-paradox

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Greimann, Dirk
Data de Publicação: 2016
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644405
Resumo: According to Peter Aczel, the inconsistency of Frege’s system in Grundgesetze is due, not to the introduction of sets, as is usually thought, but to the introduction of the Horizontal. His argument is that the principles governing sets are intuitively correct and therefore consistent, while the scheme introducing the Horizontal amounts to an internal definition of truth conflicting with Tarski’s classic result on the undefinability of truth in the object language. The aim of this paper is to show that the Horizontal is innocent: Aczel’s diagnosis is based on a mistaken view of the structure underlying Frege’s ideal language.
id UNICAMP-17_07c4db81acdca68e195040f9396ede1b
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644405
network_acronym_str UNICAMP-17
network_name_str Manuscrito (Online)
repository_id_str
spelling Frege’s horizontal and the liar-paradoxFrege’s Horizontal. Liar-paradox. Truth. The True. Undefinability of truthAccording to Peter Aczel, the inconsistency of Frege’s system in Grundgesetze is due, not to the introduction of sets, as is usually thought, but to the introduction of the Horizontal. His argument is that the principles governing sets are intuitively correct and therefore consistent, while the scheme introducing the Horizontal amounts to an internal definition of truth conflicting with Tarski’s classic result on the undefinability of truth in the object language. The aim of this paper is to show that the Horizontal is innocent: Aczel’s diagnosis is based on a mistaken view of the structure underlying Frege’s ideal language.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-03-21info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644405Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 26 n. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 359-387Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 359-387Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 359-3872317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644405/11827Copyright (c) 2003 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGreimann, Dirk2016-03-21T10:43:56Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644405Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2016-03-21T10:43:56Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Frege’s horizontal and the liar-paradox
title Frege’s horizontal and the liar-paradox
spellingShingle Frege’s horizontal and the liar-paradox
Greimann, Dirk
Frege’s Horizontal. Liar-paradox. Truth. The True. Undefinability of truth
title_short Frege’s horizontal and the liar-paradox
title_full Frege’s horizontal and the liar-paradox
title_fullStr Frege’s horizontal and the liar-paradox
title_full_unstemmed Frege’s horizontal and the liar-paradox
title_sort Frege’s horizontal and the liar-paradox
author Greimann, Dirk
author_facet Greimann, Dirk
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Greimann, Dirk
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Frege’s Horizontal. Liar-paradox. Truth. The True. Undefinability of truth
topic Frege’s Horizontal. Liar-paradox. Truth. The True. Undefinability of truth
description According to Peter Aczel, the inconsistency of Frege’s system in Grundgesetze is due, not to the introduction of sets, as is usually thought, but to the introduction of the Horizontal. His argument is that the principles governing sets are intuitively correct and therefore consistent, while the scheme introducing the Horizontal amounts to an internal definition of truth conflicting with Tarski’s classic result on the undefinability of truth in the object language. The aim of this paper is to show that the Horizontal is innocent: Aczel’s diagnosis is based on a mistaken view of the structure underlying Frege’s ideal language.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-03-21
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644405
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644405
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644405/11827
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2003 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2003 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 26 n. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 359-387
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 359-387
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 359-387
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
_version_ 1800216566187425792

Registros relacionados