Michael Bearney, Frege and the paradox of analysis

• Autor(a) principal: Pinto, Silvio
• Data de Publicação: 2001
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8659591
• topic: Frege; Paradoxo da análise; Linguagem

In his most recent book on Frege (1996), Michael Beaney defends the view that the sense/ reference distinction introduced by Gottlob Frege was meant to solve the paradox of analysis. Upon considering many ways of interpreting the Fregean notions of sense and ways of splitting up the sense of a sentence (a thought), Beaney concludes that the Fregean distinctions cannot help to see a way out of this paradox. Here I will firstly discuss some of Beaney's attempts at making sense of the notion of a sentence's content. I will secondly disagree with Beaney's final proposal as to how to dissolve the paradox of analysis. And I will finally suggest that the solution of the paradox requires a notion of content which is essentially incomplete but completes itself partially as language evolves.