Hume on representation, reason and motivation
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 1997 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380 |
Resumo: | In this paper, we re-evaluate some of Hume's most famous arguments in Book II and III in the light of some of the positions he holds in Book I of the “Treatise”. Hume’s Representation Argument in Book II holds that a passion is “an original existence... and contains not any representative quality”(T’413). We evaluate this claim against the backdrop of Hume’ general account of impressions and ideas as found in Book I, and argue that Hume holds that no impressions represent: representation is a function limited to ideas. We then exmine the role the Representation Argument plays in Hume’s arguments, in Book II and III, about the inertia of reason with respect to motivation. Our interpretation of these arguments is constrained by Book I’s, “Of the influence of belief”, where Hume argues that it is a distinguishing characteristic of at least some beliefs that they do indeed motivate. The resulting interpretations hold no comfort for noncognitivistic readings of Hume. |
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Hume on representation, reason and motivationHumeRazãoMotivaçãoIn this paper, we re-evaluate some of Hume's most famous arguments in Book II and III in the light of some of the positions he holds in Book I of the “Treatise”. Hume’s Representation Argument in Book II holds that a passion is “an original existence... and contains not any representative quality”(T’413). We evaluate this claim against the backdrop of Hume’ general account of impressions and ideas as found in Book I, and argue that Hume holds that no impressions represent: representation is a function limited to ideas. We then exmine the role the Representation Argument plays in Hume’s arguments, in Book II and III, about the inertia of reason with respect to motivation. Our interpretation of these arguments is constrained by Book I’s, “Of the influence of belief”, where Hume argues that it is a distinguishing characteristic of at least some beliefs that they do indeed motivate. The resulting interpretations hold no comfort for noncognitivistic readings of Hume.Universidade Estadual de Campinas1997-10-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 2 (1997): out.; 47 - 76Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 20 No. 2 (1997): Oct.; 47 - 76Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 20 Núm. 2 (1997): out.; 47 - 762317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380/28427Estados Unidos; Contemporâneo Copyright (c) 1997 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCohon , RachelOwen , David2022-05-19T13:11:42Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8665380Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-05-19T13:11:42Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Hume on representation, reason and motivation |
title |
Hume on representation, reason and motivation |
spellingShingle |
Hume on representation, reason and motivation Cohon , Rachel Hume Razão Motivação |
title_short |
Hume on representation, reason and motivation |
title_full |
Hume on representation, reason and motivation |
title_fullStr |
Hume on representation, reason and motivation |
title_full_unstemmed |
Hume on representation, reason and motivation |
title_sort |
Hume on representation, reason and motivation |
author |
Cohon , Rachel |
author_facet |
Cohon , Rachel Owen , David |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Owen , David |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Cohon , Rachel Owen , David |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Hume Razão Motivação |
topic |
Hume Razão Motivação |
description |
In this paper, we re-evaluate some of Hume's most famous arguments in Book II and III in the light of some of the positions he holds in Book I of the “Treatise”. Hume’s Representation Argument in Book II holds that a passion is “an original existence... and contains not any representative quality”(T’413). We evaluate this claim against the backdrop of Hume’ general account of impressions and ideas as found in Book I, and argue that Hume holds that no impressions represent: representation is a function limited to ideas. We then exmine the role the Representation Argument plays in Hume’s arguments, in Book II and III, about the inertia of reason with respect to motivation. Our interpretation of these arguments is constrained by Book I’s, “Of the influence of belief”, where Hume argues that it is a distinguishing characteristic of at least some beliefs that they do indeed motivate. The resulting interpretations hold no comfort for noncognitivistic readings of Hume. |
publishDate |
1997 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
1997-10-31 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Texto |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380/28427 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 1997 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 1997 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Estados Unidos; Contemporâneo |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 2 (1997): out.; 47 - 76 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 20 No. 2 (1997): Oct.; 47 - 76 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 20 Núm. 2 (1997): out.; 47 - 76 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216567632363520 |