Hume on representation, reason and motivation

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Cohon , Rachel
Data de Publicação: 1997
Outros Autores: Owen , David
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380
Resumo: In this paper, we re-evaluate some of Hume's most famous arguments in Book II and III in the light of some of the positions he holds in Book I of the “Treatise”. Hume’s Representation Argument in Book II holds that a passion is “an original existence... and contains not any representative quality”(T’413). We evaluate this claim against the backdrop of Hume’ general account of impressions and ideas as found in Book I, and argue that Hume holds that no impressions represent: representation is a function  limited to ideas. We then exmine the role the Representation Argument plays in Hume’s arguments, in Book II and III, about the inertia of reason with respect to motivation. Our interpretation of these arguments is constrained  by Book I’s, “Of the influence of belief”, where Hume argues that it is a distinguishing characteristic of at least some beliefs that they do indeed motivate. The resulting interpretations hold no comfort for noncognitivistic readings of Hume.
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spelling Hume on representation, reason and motivationHumeRazãoMotivaçãoIn this paper, we re-evaluate some of Hume's most famous arguments in Book II and III in the light of some of the positions he holds in Book I of the “Treatise”. Hume’s Representation Argument in Book II holds that a passion is “an original existence... and contains not any representative quality”(T’413). We evaluate this claim against the backdrop of Hume’ general account of impressions and ideas as found in Book I, and argue that Hume holds that no impressions represent: representation is a function  limited to ideas. We then exmine the role the Representation Argument plays in Hume’s arguments, in Book II and III, about the inertia of reason with respect to motivation. Our interpretation of these arguments is constrained  by Book I’s, “Of the influence of belief”, where Hume argues that it is a distinguishing characteristic of at least some beliefs that they do indeed motivate. The resulting interpretations hold no comfort for noncognitivistic readings of Hume.Universidade Estadual de Campinas1997-10-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 2 (1997): out.; 47 - 76Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 20 No. 2 (1997): Oct.; 47 - 76Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 20 Núm. 2 (1997): out.; 47 - 762317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380/28427Estados Unidos; Contemporâneo Copyright (c) 1997 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCohon , RachelOwen , David2022-05-19T13:11:42Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8665380Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-05-19T13:11:42Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Hume on representation, reason and motivation
title Hume on representation, reason and motivation
spellingShingle Hume on representation, reason and motivation
Cohon , Rachel
Hume
Razão
Motivação
title_short Hume on representation, reason and motivation
title_full Hume on representation, reason and motivation
title_fullStr Hume on representation, reason and motivation
title_full_unstemmed Hume on representation, reason and motivation
title_sort Hume on representation, reason and motivation
author Cohon , Rachel
author_facet Cohon , Rachel
Owen , David
author_role author
author2 Owen , David
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Cohon , Rachel
Owen , David
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Hume
Razão
Motivação
topic Hume
Razão
Motivação
description In this paper, we re-evaluate some of Hume's most famous arguments in Book II and III in the light of some of the positions he holds in Book I of the “Treatise”. Hume’s Representation Argument in Book II holds that a passion is “an original existence... and contains not any representative quality”(T’413). We evaluate this claim against the backdrop of Hume’ general account of impressions and ideas as found in Book I, and argue that Hume holds that no impressions represent: representation is a function  limited to ideas. We then exmine the role the Representation Argument plays in Hume’s arguments, in Book II and III, about the inertia of reason with respect to motivation. Our interpretation of these arguments is constrained  by Book I’s, “Of the influence of belief”, where Hume argues that it is a distinguishing characteristic of at least some beliefs that they do indeed motivate. The resulting interpretations hold no comfort for noncognitivistic readings of Hume.
publishDate 1997
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1997-10-31
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Texto
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665380/28427
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 1997 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 1997 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Estados Unidos; Contemporâneo
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 20 n. 2 (1997): out.; 47 - 76
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 20 No. 2 (1997): Oct.; 47 - 76
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 20 Núm. 2 (1997): out.; 47 - 76
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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