ON THE ORDINARY NOTION OF SUBSTANCE. REPLY TO ABREU ZAVALETA

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: GÓMEZ-TORRENTE,MARIO
Data de Publicação: 2020
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400108
Resumo: Abstract My proposed mechanism of reference fixing for ordinary natural kind terms in the book Roads to Reference appeals to the ordinary notion of substance. In this note I reply to an objection by Martín Abreu Zavaleta that that notion is too vague to allow for a sufficiently constrained property to become the referent of a given ordinary substance term. I argue that the notion of substance is far less vague than Abreu Zavaleta claims.
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spelling ON THE ORDINARY NOTION OF SUBSTANCE. REPLY TO ABREU ZAVALETANumeral Kind TermsSubstancesReferenceAbstract My proposed mechanism of reference fixing for ordinary natural kind terms in the book Roads to Reference appeals to the ordinary notion of substance. In this note I reply to an objection by Martín Abreu Zavaleta that that notion is too vague to allow for a sufficiently constrained property to become the referent of a given ordinary substance term. I argue that the notion of substance is far less vague than Abreu Zavaleta claims.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2020-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400108Manuscrito v.43 n.4 2020reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mdinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGÓMEZ-TORRENTE,MARIOeng2020-11-05T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452020000400108Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2020-11-05T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv ON THE ORDINARY NOTION OF SUBSTANCE. REPLY TO ABREU ZAVALETA
title ON THE ORDINARY NOTION OF SUBSTANCE. REPLY TO ABREU ZAVALETA
spellingShingle ON THE ORDINARY NOTION OF SUBSTANCE. REPLY TO ABREU ZAVALETA
GÓMEZ-TORRENTE,MARIO
Numeral Kind Terms
Substances
Reference
title_short ON THE ORDINARY NOTION OF SUBSTANCE. REPLY TO ABREU ZAVALETA
title_full ON THE ORDINARY NOTION OF SUBSTANCE. REPLY TO ABREU ZAVALETA
title_fullStr ON THE ORDINARY NOTION OF SUBSTANCE. REPLY TO ABREU ZAVALETA
title_full_unstemmed ON THE ORDINARY NOTION OF SUBSTANCE. REPLY TO ABREU ZAVALETA
title_sort ON THE ORDINARY NOTION OF SUBSTANCE. REPLY TO ABREU ZAVALETA
author GÓMEZ-TORRENTE,MARIO
author_facet GÓMEZ-TORRENTE,MARIO
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv GÓMEZ-TORRENTE,MARIO
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Numeral Kind Terms
Substances
Reference
topic Numeral Kind Terms
Substances
Reference
description Abstract My proposed mechanism of reference fixing for ordinary natural kind terms in the book Roads to Reference appeals to the ordinary notion of substance. In this note I reply to an objection by Martín Abreu Zavaleta that that notion is too vague to allow for a sufficiently constrained property to become the referent of a given ordinary substance term. I argue that the notion of substance is far less vague than Abreu Zavaleta claims.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-12-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400108
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400108
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.md
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito v.43 n.4 2020
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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