On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaleta

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Gómez-Torrente, Mario
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664463
Resumo: My proposed mechanism of reference fixing for ordinary natural kind terms in the book Roads to Reference appeals to the ordinary notion of substance. In this note I reply to an objection by Martín Abreu Zavaleta that that notion is too vague to allow for a sufficiently constrained property to become the referent of a given ordinary substance term. I argue that the notion of substance is far less vague than Abreu Zavaleta claims.
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spelling On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaletaOn the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaletaOn the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaletaTermos de tipo numeralSubstânciasReferênciaTérminos de tipo numéricoSustanciasReferenciaNumeral kind termSubstancesReferenceMy proposed mechanism of reference fixing for ordinary natural kind terms in the book Roads to Reference appeals to the ordinary notion of substance. In this note I reply to an objection by Martín Abreu Zavaleta that that notion is too vague to allow for a sufficiently constrained property to become the referent of a given ordinary substance term. I argue that the notion of substance is far less vague than Abreu Zavaleta claims.My proposed mechanism of reference fixing for ordinary natural kind terms in the book Roads to Reference appeals to the ordinary notion of substance. In this note I reply to an objection by Martín Abreu Zavaleta that that notion is too vague to allow for a sufficiently constrained property to become the referent of a given ordinary substance term. I argue that the notion of substance is far less vague than Abreu Zavaleta claims.My proposed mechanism of reference fixing for ordinary natural kind terms in the book Roads to Reference appeals to the ordinary notion of substance. In this note I reply to an objection by Martín Abreu Zavaleta that that notion is too vague to allow for a sufficiently constrained property to become the referent of a given ordinary substance term. I argue that the notion of substance is far less vague than Abreu Zavaleta claims.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2021-02-15info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextoTextoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664463Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 108-115Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 108-115Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 108-1152317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPenghttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664463/26089Spanish; ContemporaryEspaña; ContemporáneoEspanha; ContemporâneoCopyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessGómez-Torrente, Mario2021-02-15T20:50:59Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8664463Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2021-02-15T20:50:59Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaleta
On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaleta
On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaleta
title On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaleta
spellingShingle On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaleta
Gómez-Torrente, Mario
Termos de tipo numeral
Substâncias
Referência
Términos de tipo numérico
Sustancias
Referencia
Numeral kind term
Substances
Reference
title_short On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaleta
title_full On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaleta
title_fullStr On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaleta
title_full_unstemmed On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaleta
title_sort On the ordinary notion of substance. Reply to abreu zavaleta
author Gómez-Torrente, Mario
author_facet Gómez-Torrente, Mario
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Gómez-Torrente, Mario
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Termos de tipo numeral
Substâncias
Referência
Términos de tipo numérico
Sustancias
Referencia
Numeral kind term
Substances
Reference
topic Termos de tipo numeral
Substâncias
Referência
Términos de tipo numérico
Sustancias
Referencia
Numeral kind term
Substances
Reference
description My proposed mechanism of reference fixing for ordinary natural kind terms in the book Roads to Reference appeals to the ordinary notion of substance. In this note I reply to an objection by Martín Abreu Zavaleta that that notion is too vague to allow for a sufficiently constrained property to become the referent of a given ordinary substance term. I argue that the notion of substance is far less vague than Abreu Zavaleta claims.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-02-15
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Texto
Texto
info:eu-repo/semantics/other
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664463
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664463
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8664463/26089
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2020 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv Spanish; Contemporary
España; Contemporáneo
Espanha; Contemporâneo
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 43 n. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 108-115
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 43 No. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 108-115
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 43 Núm. 4 (2020): out./dez.; 108-115
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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