PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISM
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000200016 |
Resumo: | Abstract Demonstrative thoughts are distinguished by the fact that their contents are determined relationally, via perception, rather than descriptively. Therefore, a fundamental task of a theory of demonstrative thought is to elucidate how facts about visual perception can explain how these thoughts come to have the contents that they do. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how cognitive psychology may help us solve this metasemantic question, through empirical models of visual processing. Although there is a dispute between attentional and non-attentional models concerning the best metasemantic mechanism for demonstrative thoughts, in this paper I will argue in favor of a hybrid model, which combines both types of processes. In this picture, attentional and non-attentional mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and each plays a specific role in determining the singular content of demonstrative thoughts. |
id |
UNICAMP-17_2a9c9d8b5666be337c1b4a411db40876 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:scielo:S0100-60452020000200016 |
network_acronym_str |
UNICAMP-17 |
network_name_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISMDemonstrative thoughtObject perceptionObject representationAttentionAbstract Demonstrative thoughts are distinguished by the fact that their contents are determined relationally, via perception, rather than descriptively. Therefore, a fundamental task of a theory of demonstrative thought is to elucidate how facts about visual perception can explain how these thoughts come to have the contents that they do. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how cognitive psychology may help us solve this metasemantic question, through empirical models of visual processing. Although there is a dispute between attentional and non-attentional models concerning the best metasemantic mechanism for demonstrative thoughts, in this paper I will argue in favor of a hybrid model, which combines both types of processes. In this picture, attentional and non-attentional mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and each plays a specific role in determining the singular content of demonstrative thoughts.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2020-06-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000200016Manuscrito v.43 n.2 2020reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n2.fcinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessCARVALHO,FELIPE NOGUEIRA DEeng2020-07-22T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452020000200016Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2020-07-22T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISM |
title |
PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISM |
spellingShingle |
PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISM CARVALHO,FELIPE NOGUEIRA DE Demonstrative thought Object perception Object representation Attention |
title_short |
PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISM |
title_full |
PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISM |
title_fullStr |
PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISM |
title_full_unstemmed |
PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISM |
title_sort |
PERCEPTION, ATTENTION AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT: IN DEFENSE OF A HYBRID METASEMANTIC MECHANISM |
author |
CARVALHO,FELIPE NOGUEIRA DE |
author_facet |
CARVALHO,FELIPE NOGUEIRA DE |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
CARVALHO,FELIPE NOGUEIRA DE |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Demonstrative thought Object perception Object representation Attention |
topic |
Demonstrative thought Object perception Object representation Attention |
description |
Abstract Demonstrative thoughts are distinguished by the fact that their contents are determined relationally, via perception, rather than descriptively. Therefore, a fundamental task of a theory of demonstrative thought is to elucidate how facts about visual perception can explain how these thoughts come to have the contents that they do. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how cognitive psychology may help us solve this metasemantic question, through empirical models of visual processing. Although there is a dispute between attentional and non-attentional models concerning the best metasemantic mechanism for demonstrative thoughts, in this paper I will argue in favor of a hybrid model, which combines both types of processes. In this picture, attentional and non-attentional mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and each plays a specific role in determining the singular content of demonstrative thoughts. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-06-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000200016 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000200016 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n2.fc |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito v.43 n.2 2020 reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1748950065908547584 |