BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: VALENTE,MATHEUS
Data de Publicação: 2020
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400116
Resumo: Abstract This is a critical notice of Mario Gómez-Torrente's novel account of demonstrative reference presented in chapter 2 of the recently published book Roads to Reference. After presenting the main tenets of his view (including the existence of a multitude of cases where demonstrative reference is indeterminate), I go on to critically examine a couple of its features. In section 2, I assess Gómez-Torrente’s assumption that demonstrative thought based on perception is less likely to succumb to indeterminacy than the others. I show that this aspect of his view invites unwelcome consequences regarding the transparency of thought. I do however suggest that this problem could be overcome by individuating perceptual intentions dynamically. In section 3, I express a distinct worry regarding a case, introduced en passant by Gómez-Torrente, that involves successful demonstrative reference regardless of its utterer's conflicting intentions, a result that seems to contradict his general theory. Instead of conceiving the case as exceptional, I use it to motivate the necessity of distinguishing between a subject’s referential intentions and a subject’s merely collateral beliefs about the target of his utterance.
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spelling BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCEReferenceConflicting IntentionsDemonstrativesIndexicals ContentAbstract This is a critical notice of Mario Gómez-Torrente's novel account of demonstrative reference presented in chapter 2 of the recently published book Roads to Reference. After presenting the main tenets of his view (including the existence of a multitude of cases where demonstrative reference is indeterminate), I go on to critically examine a couple of its features. In section 2, I assess Gómez-Torrente’s assumption that demonstrative thought based on perception is less likely to succumb to indeterminacy than the others. I show that this aspect of his view invites unwelcome consequences regarding the transparency of thought. I do however suggest that this problem could be overcome by individuating perceptual intentions dynamically. In section 3, I express a distinct worry regarding a case, introduced en passant by Gómez-Torrente, that involves successful demonstrative reference regardless of its utterer's conflicting intentions, a result that seems to contradict his general theory. Instead of conceiving the case as exceptional, I use it to motivate the necessity of distinguishing between a subject’s referential intentions and a subject’s merely collateral beliefs about the target of his utterance.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2020-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400116Manuscrito v.43 n.4 2020reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.mlinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVALENTE,MATHEUSeng2020-11-05T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452020000400116Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2020-11-05T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE
title BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE
spellingShingle BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE
VALENTE,MATHEUS
Reference
Conflicting Intentions
Demonstratives
Indexicals Content
title_short BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE
title_full BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE
title_fullStr BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE
title_full_unstemmed BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE
title_sort BIFURCATIONS ON THE ROAD: CONFLICTING INTENTIONS AND DEMONSTRATIVE REFERENCE
author VALENTE,MATHEUS
author_facet VALENTE,MATHEUS
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv VALENTE,MATHEUS
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Reference
Conflicting Intentions
Demonstratives
Indexicals Content
topic Reference
Conflicting Intentions
Demonstratives
Indexicals Content
description Abstract This is a critical notice of Mario Gómez-Torrente's novel account of demonstrative reference presented in chapter 2 of the recently published book Roads to Reference. After presenting the main tenets of his view (including the existence of a multitude of cases where demonstrative reference is indeterminate), I go on to critically examine a couple of its features. In section 2, I assess Gómez-Torrente’s assumption that demonstrative thought based on perception is less likely to succumb to indeterminacy than the others. I show that this aspect of his view invites unwelcome consequences regarding the transparency of thought. I do however suggest that this problem could be overcome by individuating perceptual intentions dynamically. In section 3, I express a distinct worry regarding a case, introduced en passant by Gómez-Torrente, that involves successful demonstrative reference regardless of its utterer's conflicting intentions, a result that seems to contradict his general theory. Instead of conceiving the case as exceptional, I use it to motivate the necessity of distinguishing between a subject’s referential intentions and a subject’s merely collateral beliefs about the target of his utterance.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2020-12-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400116
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452020000400116
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0100-6045.2020.v43n4.ml
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito v.43 n.4 2020
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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