Irrational inference and rational belief Hume’s justification of induction

• Autor(a) principal: Swain, Corliss G.
• Data de Publicação: 1997
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8665451
• topic: Hume; Inferência irracional; Crença racional

New arguments are presented for rejecting the idea that Hume was a sceptic about causal reasoning. I argue that Hume intended to show that causal inferences are rational, and that his attempt to do so was successful. In Part I an account of what it is to be a rational inference is proposed. Part II it is argued that  Hume’s  arguments that we are not determined by reason when we make causal inferences amount to an attack on a certain conception of how reasons cause beliefs for which they are supposed to be reasons, rather than na atack on the view that casual inferences envolve reasons. In Part III I show how Hume proposes to justify causal reasoning. Part IV I discuss the limitations of Hume’s justification, and why he sees his view as sceptical. In Part V, I discuss how Hume deals with the sceptical challeng to his justification, and argue that, although Hume does not meet the sceptic’s challenge, that does not prevent his arguments from being a justification of casual reasoning.