Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Chateaubriand, Oswaldo
Data de Publicação: 2016
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126
Resumo: In §1 I suggest that although my theory of truth as identification is not a correspondence theory of truth in the sense of these terms used by the logical positivists, it can nevertheless be naturally interpreted as a correspondence theory of truth. In §2 I argue that whereas a correspondence theory of truth need not be a realist theory of truth, any sufficiently elaborate realist theory of truth should be interpretable as a correspondence theory of truth. I illustrate this with Frege’s denotational theory of truth.
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spelling Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio vieroCorrespondence. Truth. Realism. IdentificationIn §1 I suggest that although my theory of truth as identification is not a correspondence theory of truth in the sense of these terms used by the logical positivists, it can nevertheless be naturally interpreted as a correspondence theory of truth. In §2 I argue that whereas a correspondence theory of truth need not be a realist theory of truth, any sufficiently elaborate realist theory of truth should be interpretable as a correspondence theory of truth. I illustrate this with Frege’s denotational theory of truth.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-03-16info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 27 n. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-53Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 27 No. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-53Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 27 Núm. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-532317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126/11563Copyright (c) 2004 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessChateaubriand, Oswaldo2016-03-16T15:49:02Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644126Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2016-03-16T15:49:02Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero
title Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero
spellingShingle Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero
Chateaubriand, Oswaldo
Correspondence. Truth. Realism. Identification
title_short Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero
title_full Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero
title_fullStr Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero
title_full_unstemmed Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero
title_sort Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero
author Chateaubriand, Oswaldo
author_facet Chateaubriand, Oswaldo
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Chateaubriand, Oswaldo
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Correspondence. Truth. Realism. Identification
topic Correspondence. Truth. Realism. Identification
description In §1 I suggest that although my theory of truth as identification is not a correspondence theory of truth in the sense of these terms used by the logical positivists, it can nevertheless be naturally interpreted as a correspondence theory of truth. In §2 I argue that whereas a correspondence theory of truth need not be a realist theory of truth, any sufficiently elaborate realist theory of truth should be interpretable as a correspondence theory of truth. I illustrate this with Frege’s denotational theory of truth.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-03-16
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126/11563
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2004 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2004 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 27 n. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-53
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 27 No. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-53
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 27 Núm. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-53
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
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instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
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reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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