Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126 |
Resumo: | In §1 I suggest that although my theory of truth as identification is not a correspondence theory of truth in the sense of these terms used by the logical positivists, it can nevertheless be naturally interpreted as a correspondence theory of truth. In §2 I argue that whereas a correspondence theory of truth need not be a realist theory of truth, any sufficiently elaborate realist theory of truth should be interpretable as a correspondence theory of truth. I illustrate this with Frege’s denotational theory of truth. |
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Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio vieroCorrespondence. Truth. Realism. IdentificationIn §1 I suggest that although my theory of truth as identification is not a correspondence theory of truth in the sense of these terms used by the logical positivists, it can nevertheless be naturally interpreted as a correspondence theory of truth. In §2 I argue that whereas a correspondence theory of truth need not be a realist theory of truth, any sufficiently elaborate realist theory of truth should be interpretable as a correspondence theory of truth. I illustrate this with Frege’s denotational theory of truth.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-03-16info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 27 n. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-53Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 27 No. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-53Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 27 Núm. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-532317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126/11563Copyright (c) 2004 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessChateaubriand, Oswaldo2016-03-16T15:49:02Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644126Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2016-03-16T15:49:02Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero |
title |
Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero |
spellingShingle |
Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero Chateaubriand, Oswaldo Correspondence. Truth. Realism. Identification |
title_short |
Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero |
title_full |
Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero |
title_fullStr |
Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero |
title_full_unstemmed |
Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero |
title_sort |
Realism and correspondence: reply to arno aurélio viero |
author |
Chateaubriand, Oswaldo |
author_facet |
Chateaubriand, Oswaldo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Chateaubriand, Oswaldo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Correspondence. Truth. Realism. Identification |
topic |
Correspondence. Truth. Realism. Identification |
description |
In §1 I suggest that although my theory of truth as identification is not a correspondence theory of truth in the sense of these terms used by the logical positivists, it can nevertheless be naturally interpreted as a correspondence theory of truth. In §2 I argue that whereas a correspondence theory of truth need not be a realist theory of truth, any sufficiently elaborate realist theory of truth should be interpretable as a correspondence theory of truth. I illustrate this with Frege’s denotational theory of truth. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-03-16 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644126/11563 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2004 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2004 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 27 n. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-53 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 27 No. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-53 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 27 Núm. 1 (2004): Jan./Jun.; 47-53 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566159114240 |