Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Rolla,Giovanni
Data de Publicação: 2016
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000300005
Resumo: ABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I call embodied rationality -, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario.
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spelling Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied RationalityDisjunctivismDream SkepticismRationalityActionismABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I call embodied rationality -, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2016-09-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000300005Manuscrito v.39 n.3 2016reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2016.v39n3.grinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessRolla,Giovannieng2016-11-28T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452016000300005Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2016-11-28T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality
title Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality
spellingShingle Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality
Rolla,Giovanni
Disjunctivism
Dream Skepticism
Rationality
Actionism
title_short Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality
title_full Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality
title_fullStr Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality
title_full_unstemmed Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality
title_sort Epistemic Immodesty and Embodied Rationality
author Rolla,Giovanni
author_facet Rolla,Giovanni
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Rolla,Giovanni
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Disjunctivism
Dream Skepticism
Rationality
Actionism
topic Disjunctivism
Dream Skepticism
Rationality
Actionism
description ABSTRACT Based on Pritchard's distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement - what I call embodied rationality -, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-09-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000300005
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000300005
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0100-6045.2016.v39n3.gr
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito v.39 n.3 2016
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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