On a logic for ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644715 |
Resumo: | Some arguments use ‘generic’, or ‘typical’, objects. An explanation for (some aspects of) this idea in terms of ‘almost all’ is suggested. The intuition of ‘almost all’ as ‘but for a few exceptions’ is rendered precise by means of ultrafilters. A logical system, with generalized quantifiers for ‘almost all’, is proposed as a basis for generic reasoning. This logic is monotonic, has a simple sound and complete deductive calculus, and is a conservative extension of classical first-order logic, with which it shares several properties. For generic reasoning, generic individuals are introduced and internalized as generic constants, thereby producing conservative extensions where one can reason about generic objects as intended. A many-sorted version of this logic is introduced to handle distinct notions of ‘large’ subsets. Other possible applications for this logic are indicated. |
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On a logic for ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoningUltrafilter logic‘almost all’semanticaxiomatizationsoundnesscompleteness‘typical’ objectgeneric constantrelative ‘most’sorted ultrafilter logicsorted ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoningSome arguments use ‘generic’, or ‘typical’, objects. An explanation for (some aspects of) this idea in terms of ‘almost all’ is suggested. The intuition of ‘almost all’ as ‘but for a few exceptions’ is rendered precise by means of ultrafilters. A logical system, with generalized quantifiers for ‘almost all’, is proposed as a basis for generic reasoning. This logic is monotonic, has a simple sound and complete deductive calculus, and is a conservative extension of classical first-order logic, with which it shares several properties. For generic reasoning, generic individuals are introduced and internalized as generic constants, thereby producing conservative extensions where one can reason about generic objects as intended. A many-sorted version of this logic is introduced to handle distinct notions of ‘large’ subsets. Other possible applications for this logic are indicated.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-04-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644715Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 191-271Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 191-271Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 191-2712317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644715/12033Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessVeloso, Paulo A. S.2016-04-01T16:48:56Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644715Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2016-04-01T16:48:56Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
On a logic for ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning |
title |
On a logic for ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning |
spellingShingle |
On a logic for ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning Veloso, Paulo A. S. Ultrafilter logic ‘almost all’ semantic axiomatization soundness completeness ‘typical’ object generic constant relative ‘most’ sorted ultrafilter logic sorted ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning |
title_short |
On a logic for ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning |
title_full |
On a logic for ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning |
title_fullStr |
On a logic for ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning |
title_full_unstemmed |
On a logic for ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning |
title_sort |
On a logic for ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning |
author |
Veloso, Paulo A. S. |
author_facet |
Veloso, Paulo A. S. |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Veloso, Paulo A. S. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Ultrafilter logic ‘almost all’ semantic axiomatization soundness completeness ‘typical’ object generic constant relative ‘most’ sorted ultrafilter logic sorted ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning |
topic |
Ultrafilter logic ‘almost all’ semantic axiomatization soundness completeness ‘typical’ object generic constant relative ‘most’ sorted ultrafilter logic sorted ‘almost all’ and ‘generic’ reasoning |
description |
Some arguments use ‘generic’, or ‘typical’, objects. An explanation for (some aspects of) this idea in terms of ‘almost all’ is suggested. The intuition of ‘almost all’ as ‘but for a few exceptions’ is rendered precise by means of ultrafilters. A logical system, with generalized quantifiers for ‘almost all’, is proposed as a basis for generic reasoning. This logic is monotonic, has a simple sound and complete deductive calculus, and is a conservative extension of classical first-order logic, with which it shares several properties. For generic reasoning, generic individuals are introduced and internalized as generic constants, thereby producing conservative extensions where one can reason about generic objects as intended. A many-sorted version of this logic is introduced to handle distinct notions of ‘large’ subsets. Other possible applications for this logic are indicated. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-04-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644715 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644715 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644715/12033 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 191-271 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 191-271 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 1 (2002): Jan./Jun.; 191-271 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566585884672 |