Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Millán,Gustavo Ortiz
Data de Publicação: 2016
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000200119
Resumo: Abstract: Martha Nussbaum tells us that emotions are cognitive value judgments. She claims that her theory, the neo-Stoic theory of emotions, can handle traditional objections to cognitive theories of emotions. However, in this paper I hold that she improperly takes advantage of the ambiguity of the term "cognition": she faces the problems that arise when the term "cognition" is used in a very narrow sense (which claims that emotions are beliefs), resorting to a very wide sense under which any mental process is cognitive. I argue that this move does not solve the problems of the traditional cognitive theories of emotions. In order to show this, I distinguish four senses in which the term "cognitive" is used in theories of emotions, I analyze the ways Nussbaum uses them and why this move does not solve the traditional objections.
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spelling Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotionsNussbaumValue judgmentsCognitionEmotionsNeo-StoicismAbstract: Martha Nussbaum tells us that emotions are cognitive value judgments. She claims that her theory, the neo-Stoic theory of emotions, can handle traditional objections to cognitive theories of emotions. However, in this paper I hold that she improperly takes advantage of the ambiguity of the term "cognition": she faces the problems that arise when the term "cognition" is used in a very narrow sense (which claims that emotions are beliefs), resorting to a very wide sense under which any mental process is cognitive. I argue that this move does not solve the problems of the traditional cognitive theories of emotions. In order to show this, I distinguish four senses in which the term "cognitive" is used in theories of emotions, I analyze the ways Nussbaum uses them and why this move does not solve the traditional objections.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2016-06-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000200119Manuscrito v.39 n.2 2016reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N2.GOMinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMillán,Gustavo Ortizeng2016-10-24T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452016000200119Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2016-10-24T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions
title Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions
spellingShingle Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions
Millán,Gustavo Ortiz
Nussbaum
Value judgments
Cognition
Emotions
Neo-Stoicism
title_short Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions
title_full Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions
title_fullStr Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions
title_full_unstemmed Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions
title_sort Nussbaum on the cognitive nature of emotions
author Millán,Gustavo Ortiz
author_facet Millán,Gustavo Ortiz
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Millán,Gustavo Ortiz
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Nussbaum
Value judgments
Cognition
Emotions
Neo-Stoicism
topic Nussbaum
Value judgments
Cognition
Emotions
Neo-Stoicism
description Abstract: Martha Nussbaum tells us that emotions are cognitive value judgments. She claims that her theory, the neo-Stoic theory of emotions, can handle traditional objections to cognitive theories of emotions. However, in this paper I hold that she improperly takes advantage of the ambiguity of the term "cognition": she faces the problems that arise when the term "cognition" is used in a very narrow sense (which claims that emotions are beliefs), resorting to a very wide sense under which any mental process is cognitive. I argue that this move does not solve the problems of the traditional cognitive theories of emotions. In order to show this, I distinguish four senses in which the term "cognitive" is used in theories of emotions, I analyze the ways Nussbaum uses them and why this move does not solve the traditional objections.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016-06-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000200119
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452016000200119
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0100-6045.2016.V39N2.GOM
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
publisher.none.fl_str_mv UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito v.39 n.2 2016
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
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