"What Is Said": three historical figures
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643588 |
Resumo: | I first present a few basic notions of philosophical semantics, namely that of linguistic meaning, linguistic understanding, truth-conditions, and What Is Said. I try to show, like contextualists today urge us to, that the distinction between linguistic meaning and What Is Said by a literal utterance of a sentence in a context should not be blurred. The notion of What Is Said, of central importance for contextualism, can be construed as a semantic or a pragmatic notion according to the role played by the notion of speaker meaning in one’s favorite theory. Then I present an overview of three historical approaches in the history of the sciences of language, focusing on the language-thought relation and showing how these notions combine differently. The first is the ideational theory of language, defended by Arnauld and Locke. The second is the classical philosophical semantics developed in the first half of XXth century. The third is today’s contextualism, developed mainly by Travis and Recanati. Here is what the comparison reveals: the “way of ideas” and contextualism agree that the notion of What Is Said should be construed as a pragmatic notion, in opposition to classical philosophical semantics cum the Gricean apparatus. |
id |
UNICAMP-17_9760ad380be4732b6e6a7e4c9f054654 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8643588 |
network_acronym_str |
UNICAMP-17 |
network_name_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
"What Is Said": three historical figures“Ce Qui Est Dit”: trois figures historiquesTruth-conditionsLinguistic meaningWhat Is saidIdeismClassical semanticsContextualism.Conditions de véritéSignification linguistiqueCe Qui Est DiIdéismeSémantique classiqueContextualisme.I first present a few basic notions of philosophical semantics, namely that of linguistic meaning, linguistic understanding, truth-conditions, and What Is Said. I try to show, like contextualists today urge us to, that the distinction between linguistic meaning and What Is Said by a literal utterance of a sentence in a context should not be blurred. The notion of What Is Said, of central importance for contextualism, can be construed as a semantic or a pragmatic notion according to the role played by the notion of speaker meaning in one’s favorite theory. Then I present an overview of three historical approaches in the history of the sciences of language, focusing on the language-thought relation and showing how these notions combine differently. The first is the ideational theory of language, defended by Arnauld and Locke. The second is the classical philosophical semantics developed in the first half of XXth century. The third is today’s contextualism, developed mainly by Travis and Recanati. Here is what the comparison reveals: the “way of ideas” and contextualism agree that the notion of What Is Said should be construed as a pragmatic notion, in opposition to classical philosophical semantics cum the Gricean apparatus. Je présente d’abord quelques notions de base de la sémantique philosophique, en particulier celles de signification linguistique, compré- hension linguistique, conditions de vérité, et “ce qui est dit”. La signification linguistique ne doit pas être confondue avec “ce qui est dit” par l’énonciation littérale d’une phrase en contexte, cette dernière notion, centrale dans le contextualisme actuel, pouvant être reconstruite comme sémantique ou pragmatique selon le rôle que l’on fait jouer à la notion de signification du locuteur. J’examine ensuite de quelle façon ces notions se combinent dans diverses approches ou “figures historiques”, en insistant sur la relation langage-pensée. La première est la théorie idéationnelle du langage, défendue par Arnauld et Locke. La seconde est la sémantique philosophique classique, qui se développe dans la première moitié du XXe siècle. La troisième est le contextualisme actuel, développé en particulier par Travis et Récanati. La comparaison révèle ceci: quant à la façon dont est reconstruite la notion de “ce qui est dit”: l’idéisme et le contextualisme s’accordent pour en faire une notion pragmatique, en opposition à la sémantique philosophique classique assortie de l’appareil gricéen.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-02-25info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionTextesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/otherapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643588Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 29 n. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 499-524Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 29 No. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 499-524Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 499-5242317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643588/11113Brazil; ContemporaryLe Brésil; ContemporainCopyright (c) 2006 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLeclerc, André2019-12-04T15:40:40Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8643588Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2019-12-04T15:40:40Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
"What Is Said": three historical figures “Ce Qui Est Dit”: trois figures historiques |
title |
"What Is Said": three historical figures |
spellingShingle |
"What Is Said": three historical figures Leclerc, André Truth-conditions Linguistic meaning What Is said Ideism Classical semantics Contextualism. Conditions de vérité Signification linguistique Ce Qui Est Di Idéisme Sémantique classique Contextualisme. |
title_short |
"What Is Said": three historical figures |
title_full |
"What Is Said": three historical figures |
title_fullStr |
"What Is Said": three historical figures |
title_full_unstemmed |
"What Is Said": three historical figures |
title_sort |
"What Is Said": three historical figures |
author |
Leclerc, André |
author_facet |
Leclerc, André |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Leclerc, André |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Truth-conditions Linguistic meaning What Is said Ideism Classical semantics Contextualism. Conditions de vérité Signification linguistique Ce Qui Est Di Idéisme Sémantique classique Contextualisme. |
topic |
Truth-conditions Linguistic meaning What Is said Ideism Classical semantics Contextualism. Conditions de vérité Signification linguistique Ce Qui Est Di Idéisme Sémantique classique Contextualisme. |
description |
I first present a few basic notions of philosophical semantics, namely that of linguistic meaning, linguistic understanding, truth-conditions, and What Is Said. I try to show, like contextualists today urge us to, that the distinction between linguistic meaning and What Is Said by a literal utterance of a sentence in a context should not be blurred. The notion of What Is Said, of central importance for contextualism, can be construed as a semantic or a pragmatic notion according to the role played by the notion of speaker meaning in one’s favorite theory. Then I present an overview of three historical approaches in the history of the sciences of language, focusing on the language-thought relation and showing how these notions combine differently. The first is the ideational theory of language, defended by Arnauld and Locke. The second is the classical philosophical semantics developed in the first half of XXth century. The third is today’s contextualism, developed mainly by Travis and Recanati. Here is what the comparison reveals: the “way of ideas” and contextualism agree that the notion of What Is Said should be construed as a pragmatic notion, in opposition to classical philosophical semantics cum the Gricean apparatus. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-02-25 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Textes info:eu-repo/semantics/other |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643588 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643588 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8643588/11113 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2006 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2006 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.coverage.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazil; Contemporary Le Brésil; Contemporain |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 29 n. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 499-524 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 29 No. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 499-524 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 29 Núm. 2 (2006): Jul./Dec.; 499-524 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216565760655360 |