Why frege thought it to be “probable” that truth is indefinable
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2016 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644397 |
Resumo: | Frege’s so-called “Regress Argument” is closely examined and it is argued that Dummett’s reconstruction of it is not satisfactory. Contra Dummett, the argument does not involve a regress, is not a reductio and not even a strictly deductive argument. Rather, what Frege tries to show is that any attempt to define truth fails to be epistemically fruitful and thus misses the very point of analytic definitions of concepts. The cause of this epistemic sterility is an inherent circularity, and it is in view of this defect that Frege suggests that truth is very likely so simple that it cannot be defined at all. This circularity, in turn, is due to the fact that Frege takes the sense of “true” to be a constitutive part of the content of acts of thinking a complete thought. Finally, I trace Frege‘s belief in this omnipresence of the sense of the word “true” in thought to his conception of judgment and suggest that it may very well be false. |
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Why frege thought it to be “probable” that truth is indefinableFrege. Truth. Thought. JudgmentFrege’s so-called “Regress Argument” is closely examined and it is argued that Dummett’s reconstruction of it is not satisfactory. Contra Dummett, the argument does not involve a regress, is not a reductio and not even a strictly deductive argument. Rather, what Frege tries to show is that any attempt to define truth fails to be epistemically fruitful and thus misses the very point of analytic definitions of concepts. The cause of this epistemic sterility is an inherent circularity, and it is in view of this defect that Frege suggests that truth is very likely so simple that it cannot be defined at all. This circularity, in turn, is due to the fact that Frege takes the sense of “true” to be a constitutive part of the content of acts of thinking a complete thought. Finally, I trace Frege‘s belief in this omnipresence of the sense of the word “true” in thought to his conception of judgment and suggest that it may very well be false.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2016-03-21info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644397Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 26 n. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 331-345Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 331-345Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 331-3452317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644397/11821Copyright (c) 2003 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessStepanians, Markus2016-03-21T10:43:56Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644397Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2016-03-21T10:43:56Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Why frege thought it to be “probable” that truth is indefinable |
title |
Why frege thought it to be “probable” that truth is indefinable |
spellingShingle |
Why frege thought it to be “probable” that truth is indefinable Stepanians, Markus Frege. Truth. Thought. Judgment |
title_short |
Why frege thought it to be “probable” that truth is indefinable |
title_full |
Why frege thought it to be “probable” that truth is indefinable |
title_fullStr |
Why frege thought it to be “probable” that truth is indefinable |
title_full_unstemmed |
Why frege thought it to be “probable” that truth is indefinable |
title_sort |
Why frege thought it to be “probable” that truth is indefinable |
author |
Stepanians, Markus |
author_facet |
Stepanians, Markus |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Stepanians, Markus |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Frege. Truth. Thought. Judgment |
topic |
Frege. Truth. Thought. Judgment |
description |
Frege’s so-called “Regress Argument” is closely examined and it is argued that Dummett’s reconstruction of it is not satisfactory. Contra Dummett, the argument does not involve a regress, is not a reductio and not even a strictly deductive argument. Rather, what Frege tries to show is that any attempt to define truth fails to be epistemically fruitful and thus misses the very point of analytic definitions of concepts. The cause of this epistemic sterility is an inherent circularity, and it is in view of this defect that Frege suggests that truth is very likely so simple that it cannot be defined at all. This circularity, in turn, is due to the fact that Frege takes the sense of “true” to be a constitutive part of the content of acts of thinking a complete thought. Finally, I trace Frege‘s belief in this omnipresence of the sense of the word “true” in thought to his conception of judgment and suggest that it may very well be false. |
publishDate |
2016 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2016-03-21 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644397 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644397 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644397/11821 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2003 Manuscrito info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2003 Manuscrito |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 26 n. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 331-345 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 26 No. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 331-345 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 26 Núm. 2 (2003): Jul./Dez.; 331-345 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566185328640 |