Temporal Passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Tallant, Jonathan
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647875
Resumo: Certain views in the philosophy of time are described as ‘dynamic’. I borrow from Olson (2009: 3) in describing a ‘dynamic’ theory as one according to which: ‘certain times or events are absolutely present, and there is continual change in respect of which ones they are’. Dynamic views of time typically commit to the claim that “time passes”.
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spelling Temporal Passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argumentRate of passage. Time. Temporal passage. “No alternate possibilities” argumentCertain views in the philosophy of time are described as ‘dynamic’. I borrow from Olson (2009: 3) in describing a ‘dynamic’ theory as one according to which: ‘certain times or events are absolutely present, and there is continual change in respect of which ones they are’. Dynamic views of time typically commit to the claim that “time passes”.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2017-03-08info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAnálise lógicaapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647875Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 39 n. 4 (2016): out./dez.; 35-47Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 39 No. 4 (2016): out./dez.; 35-47Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 39 Núm. 4 (2016): out./dez.; 35-472317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647875/14660Copyright (c) 2016 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTallant, Jonathan2017-11-09T09:17:25Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8647875Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2017-11-09T09:17:25Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Temporal Passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument
title Temporal Passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument
spellingShingle Temporal Passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument
Tallant, Jonathan
Rate of passage. Time. Temporal passage. “No alternate possibilities” argument
title_short Temporal Passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument
title_full Temporal Passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument
title_fullStr Temporal Passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument
title_full_unstemmed Temporal Passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument
title_sort Temporal Passage and the ‘no alternate possibilities’ argument
author Tallant, Jonathan
author_facet Tallant, Jonathan
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Tallant, Jonathan
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Rate of passage. Time. Temporal passage. “No alternate possibilities” argument
topic Rate of passage. Time. Temporal passage. “No alternate possibilities” argument
description Certain views in the philosophy of time are described as ‘dynamic’. I borrow from Olson (2009: 3) in describing a ‘dynamic’ theory as one according to which: ‘certain times or events are absolutely present, and there is continual change in respect of which ones they are’. Dynamic views of time typically commit to the claim that “time passes”.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-03-08
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Análise lógica
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647875
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647875
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8647875/14660
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2016 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2016 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 39 n. 4 (2016): out./dez.; 35-47
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 39 No. 4 (2016): out./dez.; 35-47
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 39 Núm. 4 (2016): out./dez.; 35-47
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
_version_ 1800216566650896384

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