A Rate of Passage

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Maudlin, Tim
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Manuscrito (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787
Resumo: In “Temporal Passage and the ‘No Alternate Possibilities Argument’”, Jonathan Tallant takes up one objection based on the observation that if time passes at the rate of one second per second there is no other possible rate at which it could pass. The argument rests on the premise that if time passes at some rate then it could have passed at some other rate. Since no alternative rate seems to be coherent, one concludes that time cannot pass at all. The obvious weak point of the NAP is the premise itself.
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spelling A Rate of PassagePassage of time. Rate of passage. Jonathan Tallant. 'No alternate possibility' argument.In “Temporal Passage and the ‘No Alternate Possibilities Argument’”, Jonathan Tallant takes up one objection based on the observation that if time passes at the rate of one second per second there is no other possible rate at which it could pass. The argument rests on the premise that if time passes at some rate then it could have passed at some other rate. Since no alternative rate seems to be coherent, one concludes that time cannot pass at all. The obvious weak point of the NAP is the premise itself.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2017-04-24info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPesquisa teóricaapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-79Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-79Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-792317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787/15368Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscritoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMaudlin, Tim2017-11-09T09:24:26Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8648787Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2017-11-09T09:24:26Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A Rate of Passage
title A Rate of Passage
spellingShingle A Rate of Passage
Maudlin, Tim
Passage of time. Rate of passage. Jonathan Tallant. 'No alternate possibility' argument.
title_short A Rate of Passage
title_full A Rate of Passage
title_fullStr A Rate of Passage
title_full_unstemmed A Rate of Passage
title_sort A Rate of Passage
author Maudlin, Tim
author_facet Maudlin, Tim
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Maudlin, Tim
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Passage of time. Rate of passage. Jonathan Tallant. 'No alternate possibility' argument.
topic Passage of time. Rate of passage. Jonathan Tallant. 'No alternate possibility' argument.
description In “Temporal Passage and the ‘No Alternate Possibilities Argument’”, Jonathan Tallant takes up one objection based on the observation that if time passes at the rate of one second per second there is no other possible rate at which it could pass. The argument rests on the premise that if time passes at some rate then it could have passed at some other rate. Since no alternative rate seems to be coherent, one concludes that time cannot pass at all. The obvious weak point of the NAP is the premise itself.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-04-24
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Pesquisa teórica
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787
url https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8648787/15368
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Manuscrito
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade Estadual de Campinas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 40 n. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-79
Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 40 No. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-79
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 40 Núm. 1 (2017): jan./mar.; 75-79
2317-630X
reponame:Manuscrito (Online)
instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron:UNICAMP
instname_str Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
instacron_str UNICAMP
institution UNICAMP
reponame_str Manuscrito (Online)
collection Manuscrito (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br
_version_ 1800216566671867904

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