Supervenience and the problem of down-ward causation
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 2002 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644666 |
Resumo: | It seems that higher-level, nonbasic properties can only manifest their causal powers by exerting causal influence on lower-level, physically basic phenomena in the first place. A very influential line of reasoning conceives of this form of downward causation as either reducible to causation by physical properties or as ultimately untenable, because incompatible with the causal closure of physical reality. The paper argues that this is not so. It examines, first, why it is that a recent attempt by Noordhof to substantiate the notion of supervenient causation in a nonreductive framework fails. The upshot of this examination is the claim that any attempted specification of the most basic causal factors which supposedly underlie a causal transaction cannot account for the counterfactually necessary connections with the effect in question. By contrast, the specification of these factors at a higher level would allow establishing such connections. The paper closes with a discussion of how this view of autonomous causation at the higher-level can coexist with the notion of a complete specification of the causes of any physical effect exclusively in physical terms. |
id |
UNICAMP-17_c6d45916c7264b6d500b27b8d1f340ad |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644666 |
network_acronym_str |
UNICAMP-17 |
network_name_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Supervenience and the problem of down-ward causationPhysicalismmental causationcausal closurecausal relevance of propertiesIt seems that higher-level, nonbasic properties can only manifest their causal powers by exerting causal influence on lower-level, physically basic phenomena in the first place. A very influential line of reasoning conceives of this form of downward causation as either reducible to causation by physical properties or as ultimately untenable, because incompatible with the causal closure of physical reality. The paper argues that this is not so. It examines, first, why it is that a recent attempt by Noordhof to substantiate the notion of supervenient causation in a nonreductive framework fails. The upshot of this examination is the claim that any attempted specification of the most basic causal factors which supposedly underlie a causal transaction cannot account for the counterfactually necessary connections with the effect in question. By contrast, the specification of these factors at a higher level would allow establishing such connections. The paper closes with a discussion of how this view of autonomous causation at the higher-level can coexist with the notion of a complete specification of the causes of any physical effect exclusively in physical terms.Universidade Estadual de Campinas2002-03-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644666Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 3 (2002): Mar.; 251-270Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 3 (2002): Mar.; 251-270Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 3 (2002): Mar.; 251-2702317-630Xreponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMPporhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644666/12019Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofiahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMendonça, Wilson2022-05-27T17:20:50Zoai:ojs.periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br:article/8644666Revistahttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscritoPUBhttps://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/oaimwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2022-05-27T17:20:50Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Supervenience and the problem of down-ward causation |
title |
Supervenience and the problem of down-ward causation |
spellingShingle |
Supervenience and the problem of down-ward causation Mendonça, Wilson Physicalism mental causation causal closure causal relevance of properties |
title_short |
Supervenience and the problem of down-ward causation |
title_full |
Supervenience and the problem of down-ward causation |
title_fullStr |
Supervenience and the problem of down-ward causation |
title_full_unstemmed |
Supervenience and the problem of down-ward causation |
title_sort |
Supervenience and the problem of down-ward causation |
author |
Mendonça, Wilson |
author_facet |
Mendonça, Wilson |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Mendonça, Wilson |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Physicalism mental causation causal closure causal relevance of properties |
topic |
Physicalism mental causation causal closure causal relevance of properties |
description |
It seems that higher-level, nonbasic properties can only manifest their causal powers by exerting causal influence on lower-level, physically basic phenomena in the first place. A very influential line of reasoning conceives of this form of downward causation as either reducible to causation by physical properties or as ultimately untenable, because incompatible with the causal closure of physical reality. The paper argues that this is not so. It examines, first, why it is that a recent attempt by Noordhof to substantiate the notion of supervenient causation in a nonreductive framework fails. The upshot of this examination is the claim that any attempted specification of the most basic causal factors which supposedly underlie a causal transaction cannot account for the counterfactually necessary connections with the effect in question. By contrast, the specification of these factors at a higher level would allow establishing such connections. The paper closes with a discussion of how this view of autonomous causation at the higher-level can coexist with the notion of a complete specification of the causes of any physical effect exclusively in physical terms. |
publishDate |
2002 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2002-03-31 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644666 |
url |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644666 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/manuscrito/article/view/8644666/12019 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2002 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofia; v. 25 n. 3 (2002): Mar.; 251-270 Manuscrito: International Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 25 No. 3 (2002): Mar.; 251-270 Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía; Vol. 25 Núm. 3 (2002): Mar.; 251-270 2317-630X reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1800216566571204608 |