Omniscience and Semantic Information
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2017 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000400077 |
Resumo: | ABSTRACT First, I consider a few motivations to idealize epistemic logics1 in such a degree that brings up the problem of logical omniscience [LOP]. I argue that the main motivation to hold omniscience is of a philosophical-scientific2 background (Stalnaker 1991), in the sense philosophers have a not so peculiar way of investigating underlying mechanisms, i.e., the interaction of several different components of complex systems may be better understood in isolation, even if such components are not found isolated in a realistic context. It is defended that the implicit and explicit knowledge distinction (Fagin and Halpern 1988) is compatible that view since idealizations made by modal epistemic logic are so strong that the agents they describe hardly have anything in common with real agents. I conclude by showing how LOP can be accommodated in the logic of being informed (Floridi 2006) using the Inverse Relationship Principle (Barwise and Seligman 1997). 1Epistemic modal logics and the logic of being informed may collapse in many scenarios, as shown in previous articles (blind review omitted). 2Does not necessarily imply in a naturalized epistemology a la (Quine 1981). For a plea for non-naturalism as constructionism see (Floridi 2017). |
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Omniscience and Semantic InformationLogical Omniscience ProblemKnowledgeSemantic InformatioABSTRACT First, I consider a few motivations to idealize epistemic logics1 in such a degree that brings up the problem of logical omniscience [LOP]. I argue that the main motivation to hold omniscience is of a philosophical-scientific2 background (Stalnaker 1991), in the sense philosophers have a not so peculiar way of investigating underlying mechanisms, i.e., the interaction of several different components of complex systems may be better understood in isolation, even if such components are not found isolated in a realistic context. It is defended that the implicit and explicit knowledge distinction (Fagin and Halpern 1988) is compatible that view since idealizations made by modal epistemic logic are so strong that the agents they describe hardly have anything in common with real agents. I conclude by showing how LOP can be accommodated in the logic of being informed (Floridi 2006) using the Inverse Relationship Principle (Barwise and Seligman 1997). 1Epistemic modal logics and the logic of being informed may collapse in many scenarios, as shown in previous articles (blind review omitted). 2Does not necessarily imply in a naturalized epistemology a la (Quine 1981). For a plea for non-naturalism as constructionism see (Floridi 2017).UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2017-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000400077Manuscrito v.40 n.4 2017reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n4.bainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAlonso,Bernardoeng2018-02-19T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452017000400077Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2018-02-19T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Omniscience and Semantic Information |
title |
Omniscience and Semantic Information |
spellingShingle |
Omniscience and Semantic Information Alonso,Bernardo Logical Omniscience Problem Knowledge Semantic Informatio |
title_short |
Omniscience and Semantic Information |
title_full |
Omniscience and Semantic Information |
title_fullStr |
Omniscience and Semantic Information |
title_full_unstemmed |
Omniscience and Semantic Information |
title_sort |
Omniscience and Semantic Information |
author |
Alonso,Bernardo |
author_facet |
Alonso,Bernardo |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Alonso,Bernardo |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Logical Omniscience Problem Knowledge Semantic Informatio |
topic |
Logical Omniscience Problem Knowledge Semantic Informatio |
description |
ABSTRACT First, I consider a few motivations to idealize epistemic logics1 in such a degree that brings up the problem of logical omniscience [LOP]. I argue that the main motivation to hold omniscience is of a philosophical-scientific2 background (Stalnaker 1991), in the sense philosophers have a not so peculiar way of investigating underlying mechanisms, i.e., the interaction of several different components of complex systems may be better understood in isolation, even if such components are not found isolated in a realistic context. It is defended that the implicit and explicit knowledge distinction (Fagin and Halpern 1988) is compatible that view since idealizations made by modal epistemic logic are so strong that the agents they describe hardly have anything in common with real agents. I conclude by showing how LOP can be accommodated in the logic of being informed (Floridi 2006) using the Inverse Relationship Principle (Barwise and Seligman 1997). 1Epistemic modal logics and the logic of being informed may collapse in many scenarios, as shown in previous articles (blind review omitted). 2Does not necessarily imply in a naturalized epistemology a la (Quine 1981). For a plea for non-naturalism as constructionism see (Floridi 2017). |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2017-12-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000400077 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452017000400077 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0100-6045.2017.v40n4.ba |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito v.40 n.4 2017 reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1748950065390551040 |