THE HARSANYI-RAWLS DEBATE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Manuscrito (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000200089 |
Resumo: | Abstract Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty - in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself - it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance - Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule - and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) - and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others. |
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THE HARSANYI-RAWLS DEBATE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTYUncertaintyPolitical PhilosophyDifference PrincipleUtilitarianismAbstract Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty - in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself - it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance - Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule - and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) - and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others.UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência2021-06-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000200089Manuscrito v.44 n.2 2021reponame:Manuscrito (Online)instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)instacron:UNICAMP10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n2.rpinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessPERES,RAMIRO ÁVILAeng2021-06-24T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0100-60452021000200089Revistahttp://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=0100-6045&lng=pt&nrm=isoPUBhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.phpmwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br2317-630X0100-6045opendoar:2021-06-24T00:00Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
THE HARSANYI-RAWLS DEBATE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY |
title |
THE HARSANYI-RAWLS DEBATE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY |
spellingShingle |
THE HARSANYI-RAWLS DEBATE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY PERES,RAMIRO ÁVILA Uncertainty Political Philosophy Difference Principle Utilitarianism |
title_short |
THE HARSANYI-RAWLS DEBATE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY |
title_full |
THE HARSANYI-RAWLS DEBATE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY |
title_fullStr |
THE HARSANYI-RAWLS DEBATE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY |
title_full_unstemmed |
THE HARSANYI-RAWLS DEBATE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY |
title_sort |
THE HARSANYI-RAWLS DEBATE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AS DECISION THEORY UNDER UNCERTAINTY |
author |
PERES,RAMIRO ÁVILA |
author_facet |
PERES,RAMIRO ÁVILA |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
PERES,RAMIRO ÁVILA |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Uncertainty Political Philosophy Difference Principle Utilitarianism |
topic |
Uncertainty Political Philosophy Difference Principle Utilitarianism |
description |
Abstract Social decisions are often made under great uncertainty - in situations where political principles, and even standard subjective expected utility, do not apply smoothly. In the first section, we argue that the core of this problem lies in decision theory itself - it is about how to act when we do not have an adequate representation of the context of the action and of its possible consequences. Thus, we distinguish two criteria to complement decision theory under ignorance - Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin criterion. After that, we apply this analysis to political philosophy, by contrasting Harsanyi’s and Rawls’s theories of justice, respectively based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason and Wald’s maximin rule - and we end up highlighting the virtues of Rawls’s principle on practical grounds (it is intuitively attractive because of its computational simplicity, so providing a salient point for convergence) - and connect this argument to our moral intuitions and social norms requiring prudence in the case of decisions made for the sake of others. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-06-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000200089 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452021000200089 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0100-6045.2021.v44n2.rp |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
UNICAMP - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito v.44 n.2 2021 reponame:Manuscrito (Online) instname:Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) instacron:UNICAMP |
instname_str |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
instacron_str |
UNICAMP |
institution |
UNICAMP |
reponame_str |
Manuscrito (Online) |
collection |
Manuscrito (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Manuscrito (Online) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas (UNICAMP) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
mwrigley@cle.unicamp.br|| dascal@spinoza.tau.ac.il||publicacoes@cle.unicamp.br |
_version_ |
1748950065951539200 |